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The lead article in this issue is Professor Todd Pettys’s annual review of thecivil cases decided in the past Term of the United States Supreme Court.For those of you who don’t check the AJA website (amjudges.org) from
time to time, you missed out when we posted Professor Pettys’s article back in
August! He covers both the decided cases most likely to come up in our courts
and some of the early cases on the docket for the present Term.
In our second article, Professors Jennifer Robbennolt and Valerie Hans
draw on material from their book, The Psychology of Tort Law, to discuss how
tort law sometimes diverges from our com-
monsense notions of justice. When this hap-
pens, they show that it can lead to anomalies
in legal proceedings. They also suggest that a
divergence between the results obtained
through our legal system and commonsense
notions of justice can lead some to question
the justice system’s legitimacy. In only six
pages, Robbennolt and Hans provide an
overview and important insights about our
tort-law system.
Our third article provides an overview of
the assessment tools now available for risk assessments. Each state tends to
use a specific instrument. A group of researchers led by Professor Kirk Heil-
brun reviews each of the major instruments in use, discussing the strengths
and limitations of these instruments as well as the extent to which expert
opinion guided by some structured judgment process might compare in use-
fulness to these scored instruments. They conclude with recommendations
for best practices in risk assessments in court.
Of course, the issue also includes our regular features: the Resource Page,
our column on Canadian law from Judge Wayne Gorman, and a law-related
crossword from Judge Vic Fleming. The Gorman column in this issue pro-
vides an overview of Canadian law on setting bail. That subject—along with
proceedings to collect fines and fees—has become a hot topic in the United
States. The Conference of Chief Justices and several other national organiza-
tions in the United States recently published a benchcard on best practices for
the lawful collection of fines and fees. We’ve reprinted that benchcard at pages
127-128.  We also have announcements from the American Judges Associa-
tion throughout the issue, including the regular list of future AJA conferences
and the announcement of the AJA’s national awards for 2017.—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 134 of this
issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
The cover photo is of the main hall of the historic Cuya-
hoga County Courthouse in Cleveland, Ohio. The court-
house has been home to several important cases, includ-
ing the Sam Sheppard murder trial and the trial court pro-
ceedings in Terry v. Ohio and Mapp v. Ohio. The turtles
under each of the lamps on the second floor of the cour-
thouse are said to be symbolic of the slow march of the
light toward justice. Cover photo by Steve Leben.
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United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to Associa-
tion Services, National Center for State Courts, Williams-
burg, Virginia 23185-4147.  Points of view or opinions
expressed in Court Review are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the positions of the National
Center for State Courts or the American Judges Associa-
tion.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
Cite as: 53 Ct. Rev. ___ (2017).
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I am honored to join our distinguished line of AmericanJudges Association presidents, and I congratulate you ongetting and reading another wonderful edition of Court
Review, one of the crown jewels of AJA. This journal has
changed my own practice, always for the better.  For example,
I now offer “high-touch” management to lawyers in my com-
plex civil cases, based on an article in a past issue. (See David
Prince, A New Model for Case Management: Efficiency Through
Intrinsic Engagement, 50 CT. REV. 174 (2014).) The lawyers love
this approach, and it streamlines case handling even in the
most difficult cases.  Although the Board of Editors’ member-
ship is changing, with a smooth transition managed by Judge
Steve Leben, we know the quality of this journal will continue.
I just returned from our annual conference in
Cleveland, Ohio.  We were honored to hear inspir-
ing addresses by Ohio Chief Justice Maureen
O’Connor, Ohio Congresswoman Marcia Fudge,
and, at our American Judges Foundation lun-
cheon, featured speaker U.S. Senator Sherrod
Brown.  Highlights of the educational program,
ably planned by Judge Eugene Lucci and Judge
Gayle Williams-Byers, included Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky’s fabulous constitutional-law
update, wonderful plenaries on cutting-edge
issues (including judicial independence and
addressing unfair fines and fees), as well as a law-
and-literature presentation by outstanding author
Joe Starita. We also had a huge variety of top-notch choice ses-
sions, on topics like how self-help centers can improve court
litigation, new approaches to court technology, dealing with
jury bias, an elder law and guardianship update, approaches to
wrongful-death lawsuits in police-shooting cases, ways to pro-
vide procedural and pretrial justice in adult and juvenile court,
tips on high-profile cases, and ways to handle life beyond the
bench.  Our family members joined us at Mr. Starita’s plenary,
and also attended an excellent presentation on the Judicial
Family Network program.  
As usual, AJA gave awards to an outstanding group of
recipients.  I want to highlight the judicial courage award,
named after our own brave Harold Froehlich.  This year’s
recipient was Gonzalo P. Curiel, the federal judge who perse-
vered with dignity in presiding over the Trump University
lawsuit despite then-candidate Donald Trump’s attacks based
on the judge’s Latino heritage.  Do read his eloquent letter of
thanks in this edition of Court Review. AJA will continue to
honor judicial courage and independence, stand up for the
rule of law in our role as the Voice of the Judiciary®, support
equal justice, and work to advance diversity in our national
judicial community. 
The social events in Cleveland were marvelous, due to an
enormous amount of work by our own Judge Mike Cicconetti,
who received a well-deserved standing ovation at our banquet,
and our education cochairs.   Conference attendees attended a
sold out baseball game—the 19th win in the Cleveland Indians’
historic 22-game win streak!—between Cleveland and the
Detroit Tigers, toured local landmarks like the Terminal Tower
and the Cleveland Trust Building, enjoyed the AJF reception at
the historic Cuyahoga County Courthouse, visited Little Italy,
went to the Cleveland Art Museum and dined at the top-rated
restaurant there, and made group visits on successive days to
the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame.  We all enjoyed Cleveland’s
other fine restaurants too.
There is plenty planned for the coming year.  Our midyear
conference will be in Memphis, Tennessee, famous as a birth-
place of rock ’n’ roll and home of the blues, renowned for its
barbecue, and the site of the National Civil Rights Museum,
Beale Street, the Memphis Rock and Soul Museum, and Grace-
land.  Our venue is on the grounds of Graceland, and Judge
Betty Moore and Justice Robert Torres are plan-
ning a fantastic education program, as well as
events that let you taste the BBQ, hear the
music, and learn about the civil-rights history.
Sign up soon!
We have a great program set for Kauai in
September 2018 already.  Judge Catherine Carl-
son and Justice Torres have practically the
entire education program planned already, and
what could be a more wonderful venue than
this beautiful Hawaiian garden island? 
We do face challenges.  We need to plan
smart for our conferences, to make sure our
attendance is strong and that we can continue
to afford to go to worthwhile locations and offer top-quality
education.   We have succeeded when we have partnered with
other organizations, as in Seattle when our conference was held
jointly with the National Association of State Judicial Educa-
tors and the Washington state courts.  We are following that
formula for September 2019, when we will be at the beautiful
downtown Drake Hotel in Chicago, partnering with the Illinois
state courts.  Mark your calendars now!  And think about how
we can join with the courts in your area, because the earlier we
plan joint events, the better and more successful they are, and
the more new blood flows into our membership.  
We also need rededication to our committees and, through
those, to serving our members who do not come to conference.
You are one of our incredibly talented members, and we need
you to find the AJA committee that matters to you, so that AJA
can take your input and turn it into outstanding articles in
Court Review, premier resources on our website, superb pre-
sentations at conference, and, in general, great guidance to the
rest of us on being better judges.   If you haven’t filled out your
committee-preference form already, do it now and ship it to
Shelley Rockwell (srockwell@ncsc.org)!  We need you and
your knowledge, passion, and engagement.
You probably know that AJA has strong ties to many other
national court organizations. My executive committee is
already at work trying to build further ties to national minority
associations.  I have a busy year ahead tending these links on
AJA’s behalf, and I plan to keep you updated electronically on a
regular basis.  Until then, thank you again for this honor.
Catherine Shaffer
President’s Column
Footnotes
1. If the accused is a “young person” (i.e., 12 to 17 years of age) bail
is governed by the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c C-1
(Can.).  This Act contains its own bail provisions, which are sim-
ilar but not identical to the Canadian Criminal Code (see sections
28 and 29).  In addition, a bail judge who decides that a young
person should otherwise be detained can release the accused into
the “care of a responsible person” (see section 31). 
2. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 515(2) (Can.).
3. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 515(6) (Can.).
4. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 522 (Can.).
5. Section 520 of the Criminal Code states as follows:
If a justice, or a judge of the Nunavut Court of Justice,
makes an order under subsection 515(2), (5), (6), (7), (8) or
(12) or makes or vacates any order under paragraph
523(2)(b), the accused may, at any time before the trial of the
charge, apply to a judge for a review of the order.
The Supreme Court of Canada, through a series of judg-ments, has had a significant impact on the law of judicialinterim release (or “bail”) in Canada.  As will be seen, this
impact has occurred in relation to the law of bail at both the
trial and appellate level and includes two decisions rendered
this year.  In this column I intend to examine this impact by
briefly reviewing the law of bail in Canada and then illustrat-
ing the significant impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decisions in this area.  
The starting point is that in Canada, bail is entirely a crea-
ture of statute. It is solely governed by the provisions of
Canada’s Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c C-46 (Can.) at both the
trial and appellate level.  It also has constitutional status.
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA’S BAIL PROVISIONS-
TRIAL LEVEL
Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code sets out the only
grounds upon which a trial judge can deny judicial interim
release to an accused person in Canada.  For bail to be
denied it must be established that (1) the accused will fail to
appear in court; (2) it is necessary to protect the public; or
(3) it is necessary to maintain the public’s confidence in the
administration of justice.  These grounds are described in
sections 515(10)(a) to (c), and they indicate that:
[T]he detention of an accused in custody is justified
only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her
attendance in court in order to be dealt with according
to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection
or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness
to the offence, having regard to all the circumstances
including any substantial likelihood that the accused
will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence
or interference with the administration of justice; and
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence
in the administration of justice, having regard to all the
circumstances, including
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,
(ii) the gravity of the offence,
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offence, including whether a firearm
was used, and
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on convic-
tion, for a potentially lengthy term of imprison-
ment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or
whose subject matter is, a firearm, a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of three
years or more.1
There is no inherent or incidental judicial authority in
Canada in relation to the granting or denying of bail.  The
onus to establish that bail should be denied is generally on
the Crown2, but there are situations where the accused per-
son must establish that their release is warranted.3 The
same provisions apply to both.  
Bail hearings are heard in the Provincial Court (or by a
justice of the peace in some provinces) unless the accused is
charged with an offence listed in section 469 of the Crimi-
nal Code.4 If so, the bail hearing is held in the Superior
Court. The list of offences set out in section 469 includes
the offences of murder, treason, piracy, and “alarming Her
Majesty.” 
BAIL REVIEW
If bail is denied in the Provincial Court, an accused per-
son can seek to have this decision reviewed by the Superior
Court of the province. 
In R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the role of a superior court judge in
reviewing a bail decision made by a provincial court judge.
In St-Cloud the accused was denied release by a justice of
the peace. The accused applied for review by a Superior
Court Judge pursuant to section 520 of the Criminal Code.5
The reviewing judge concluded that the accused should be
released on the basis that his detention was not necessary
under section 515(10)(c).  The Crown appealed to the
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
The Impact of the Supreme Court 
of Canada on the Law of Bail
Wayne K. Gorman
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6. In R. v. Adem, [2017] 2017 ABCA 242, [2017] CarswellAlta 1310,
para. 27 (Can. Alta.), Oland was considered and the Alberta Court
of Appeal held that Oland suggests that “unless there are other
considerations that call for continued incarceration, including the
seriousness of the offence, residual public safety concerns or
flight risk, the law appears to favour release once an applicant has
established that his appeal clearly surpasses the ‘not frivolous’
hurdle.” 
Supreme Court of Canada.  The appeal was allowed and the
detention order restored.
On the issue of bail review the Supreme Court held that
the exercise of the review power contained within section
520 of the Criminal Code is prescribed and “will be appro-
priate in only three situations” (at paragraph 6):
(1) where there is admissible new evidence; (2) where
the impugned decision contains an error of law; or (3)
where the decision is clearly inappropriate. In the last of
these situations, a reviewing judge cannot simply substi-
tute his or her assessment of the evidence for that of the
justice who rendered the impugned decision. It is only if
the justice gave excessive weight to one relevant factor
or insufficient weight to another that the reviewing
judge can intervene.
The Supreme Court noted, at paragraph 92 of St-Cloud, that
section 520 of the Criminal Code does “not confer an open
ended discretion on the reviewing judge to vary the initial
decision concerning the detention or release of the accused.
Nonetheless, they establish a hybrid remedy and therefore pro-
vide greater scope than an appeal for varying the initial order.”
The Court indicated that section 520 does “not provide for a de
novo hearing” (at paragraph 94).  The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the reviewing judge “does not have the power to
interfere with the initial decision simply because he or she
would have weighed the relevant factors differently,” but a
reviewing judge “may vary the initial decision if that evidence
shows a material and relevant change in the circumstances of
the case” (at paragraph 121).
BAIL ON APPEAL
If an accused person is convicted of an offence he or she
can seek bail in the Provincial Court of Appeal if they have
appealed against conviction or sentence.  Section 679(3) of
the Criminal Code allows a Court of Appeal to grant bail
when an appeal against conviction has been filed in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
In the case of an appeal referred to in paragraph
(1)(a) or (c), the judge of the court of appeal may order
that the appellant be released pending the determination
of his appeal if the appellant establishes that
(a) the appeal or application for leave to appeal is
not frivolous;
(b) he will surrender himself into custody in
accordance with the terms of the order; and
(c) his detention is not necessary in the public
interest.
On March 23, 2017, the
Supreme Court of Canada
released its decision in R. v. Oland,
2017 SCC 17. In Oland the
accused was convicted of second-
degree murder.  He appealed and
applied to the Court of Appeal for
judicial interim release.  His appli-
cation was denied. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada it was held that
the accused should have been released by the Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court considered section 679(3) and concluded
that the appeal court judge (at paragraph 69):
[D]id not apply the correct test in assessing the
strength of Mr. Oland’s appeal and the implications flow-
ing from it. Much as he was satisfied that Mr. Oland had
raised “clearly arguable” grounds of appeal, this was not
enough. . . . [H]is reasons show[], he required more,
something in the nature of unique circumstances that
would have virtually assured a new trial or an acquittal.6
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Reasonable bail in Canada is protected by the Canadian
Constitution. Section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
indicates as follows: “Any person charged with an offence
has the right . . . . (e) not to be denied reasonable bail with-
out just cause.” 
In R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, the Supreme Court
of Canada considered this constitutional requirement and
stated that bail “is not denied for all individuals who pose a
risk of committing an offence or interfering with the admin-
istration of justice while on bail.  Bail is denied only for
those who pose a ‘substantial risk’ of committing an offence
or interfering with the administration of justice, and only
where this ‘substantial likelihood’ endangers ‘the protection
or safety of the public’” (at paragraph 39). 
On June 1st, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada ren-
dered its judgment in R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, in which it
once again considered section 11(e) of the Charter.  The
Supreme Court indicated that the words “just cause” in sec-
tion 11(e) of the Charter is used in “two contexts” (at para-
graphs 33 and 34):
First, as used in s. 11(e) of the Charter, “just cause”
relates to the circumstances in which denying bail is
constitutional: an accused has a constitutional entitle-
ment to be granted bail unless there is “just cause” to
deny it.
Second, the expression “just cause” is also com-
monly used to describe the statutory grounds that jus-
tify the pre-trial detention of an accused. These
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Reasonable bail
in Canada is
protected by 
the Canadian
Constitution.
7. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987), the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act concluding:
In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We
hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited excep-
tion. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of indi-
viduals or to the community which no condition of release
can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed
above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling
to say that this congressional determination, based as it is
upon that primary concern of every government —a con-
cern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens—on its
face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.
grounds, which are enumer-
ated in s. 515(10) of the Code,
are flight risk, public safety
and public confidence in the
administration of justice. In
most cases, it is presumed that
the accused should be
released, and he or she will not
be detained unless the Crown
can show on the basis of these
statutory criteria that deten-
tion is warranted.
The Court stated, at paragraph
40 of Antic, that:
A provision may not deny bail without “just cause[.]”
The right not to be denied bail without just cause
imposes a constitutional standard that must be met for
the denial of bail to be valid. . . . [T]here is just cause to
deny bail only if the denial (1) occurs in a “narrow set of
circumstances” and (2) the denial of bail “is necessary to
promote the proper functioning of the bail system and is
not undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail
system.” 
The Court also indicated that (at paragraph 41):7
[The] right not to be denied reasonable bail without
just cause protects accused persons from conditions and
forms of release that are unreasonable. The French ver-
sion of s. 11(e) bears this out: a person charged with an
offence has the right to a release “assortie d’un caution-
nement raisonnable” (“in conjunction with reasonable
bail[.]”) 
REASONABLE BAIL AND CASH DEPOSITS
In Antic, the Supreme Court made a number of comments
concerning the problems caused by requiring an accused per-
son to make a cash deposit to secure their release. The Court
noted that the “central purpose of the Bail Reform Act was to
avoid the harsh effects on accused persons of requiring cash
deposits where other avenues of release are available” (at para-
graph 48). The Supreme Court cautioned against setting the
amount of a surety or cash deposit “‘so high as to effectively
constitute a detention order’” (at paragraph 56). It held that a
bail judge has a “positive obligation ‘to make inquiries into
the ability of the accused to pay’” (at paragraph 56). The
Supreme Court indicated that the requirement for cash can
result in “increased incarceration of accused persons” (at
paragraph 59):
[R]equiring cash as a condition of release has the
potential to result in increased incarceration of accused
persons. Cash bail does not give impecunious persons
greater access to bail. Rather, requiring a cash deposit
will often prevent an accused person from being
released, as it did for many months in Mr. Antic’s case.
Professor Friedland observed in his study that a major-
ity of accused persons who were required to deposit
security as a condition of release were unable to raise the
necessary funds: Detention before Trial, at pp. 130 and
176. An accused person’s release should not be contin-
gent on his or her ability “to marshal[] funds or prop-
erty in advance.”
SECTION 515(10)(C)
As we have seen, section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal
Code allows bail to be denied if it “is necessary to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice.”  In R. v. Hall,
2002 SCC 64, the Supreme Court considered section
515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.  As we saw earlier the pre-
sent wording of section 515(10)(c) is very specific as
regards the four factors to be considered.  An earlier version
of this section was drafted in much broader terms.  The
wording at the time Hall was decided was as follows (at
paragraph 64):
For the purposes of this section, the detention of an
accused in custody is justified only on one or more of
the following grounds:
. . . .
(c) on any other just cause being shown and without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, where the deten-
tion is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the
administration of justice, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances, including the apparent strength of the pros-
ecution’s case, the gravity of the nature of the offence,
the circumstances surrounding its commission and the
potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.
The Court’s decision in Hall forced Parliament to enact
the present wording found in section 515(10)(c) because
the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in Hall that the
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The Supreme
Court cautioned
against setting
the amount of a
surety or cash
deposit “so high
as to effectively
constitute a
detention
order.”
The judge cannot conjure
up his own reasons for denying
bail; while the judge must look
at all the circumstances, he
must focus particularly on the
factors Parliament has speci-
fied. At the end of the day, the
judge can only deny bail if sat-
isfied that in view of these fac-
tors and related circumstances,
a reasonable member of the
community would be satisfied
that denial is necessary to
maintain confidence in the
administration of justice. . . .
For these reasons, the provision does not authorize a “stan-
dardless sweep” nor confer open-ended judicial discretion.
Rather, it strikes an appropriate balance between the rights
of the accused and the need to maintain justice in the com-
munity. In sum, it is not overbroad.
THE TEST TO BE APPLIED PURSUANT TO SECTION
515(10)(C)
In addition to considering the constitutional status of
section 515(10)(c), the Supreme Court also considered in
Hall how the provision was to be applied by bail judges. The
Supreme Court of Canada indicated, at paragraph 41, that a
judge conducting a bail hearing must before denying release
pursuant to this provision “be satisfied that detention is not
only advisable but necessary.” The Court also indicated in
Hall that the specific factors set out in section 515(10)(c)
“delineate a narrow set of circumstances under which bail
can be denied on the basis of maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice” (at paragraph 40).
After Hall, there were decisions suggesting that Hall had
interpreted 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code in such a man-
ner that it should be applied sparingly. In R. v. LaFramboise,
[2005] O.J. No. 5785, 2005 CarswellOnt 8335 (Can. Ont.),
for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted Hall as
standing for the proposition that section 515(10)(c) should
be used to deny bail “sparingly” and its use “will be justified
only in rare cases” (at paragraph 30). 
However, in St-Cloud, the Supreme Court indicated, at
paragraph 5, that section 515(10)(c) has been “unduly
restricted by the courts in some cases.” It rejected the
proposition that the denial of bail pursuant to section
515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code is “limited to exceptional
circumstances” (at paragraph 54):
In conclusion, the application of s. 515(10)(c) is not
limited to exceptional circumstances, to “unexplainable”
crimes or to certain types of crimes such as murder. The
Crown can rely on s. 515(10)(c) for any type of crime,
but it must prove — except in the cases provided for in
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words “on any other just cause being shown” in the former
section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code violated section
11(e) of the Charter were, “void” and therefore “severed”
from the section (see paragraphs 44 and 45). 
“ANY OTHER JUST CAUSE”
In Hall the Court quickly concluded that these words
violated section 11(e) of the Charter and could not be
“saved” by section one.8 The Court summarized its conclu-
sion in the following manner (at paragraph 22):
The first phrase of s. 515(10)(c) which permits denial
of bail “on any other just cause being shown” is uncon-
stitutional. Parliament cannot confer a broad discretion
on judges to grant bail, but must lay out narrow and pre-
cise circumstances in which bail can be denied: Pearson
and Morales, supra. This phrase does not specify any
particular basis upon which bail could be denied. The
denial of bail “on any other just cause” violates the
requirements enunciated in Morales, supra, and there-
fore is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence
and s. 11(e) of the Charter.
“NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE”
However, the Supreme Court reached the opposite con-
clusion in Hall as regards the effect of the words “confidence
in the administration of justice” in section 515(10)(c). The
Court concluded that it is appropriate in particular circum-
stances to deny bail on this basis alone (at paragraph 31):
[A] provision that allows bail to be denied on the
basis that the accused’s detention is required to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice is neither
superfluous nor unjustified. It serves a very real need to
permit a bail judge to detain an accused pending trial for
the purpose of maintaining the public’s confidence if the
circumstances of the case so warrant. Without public
confidence, the bail system and the justice system gener-
ally stand compromised. While the circumstances in
which recourse to this ground for bail denial may not
arise frequently, when they do it is essential that a means
of denying bail be available.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The accused in Hall had also argued that the words “con-
fidence in the administration of justice” were unconstitu-
tionally vague. The Court concluded that this portion of
subsection 515(10)(c) provided “an intelligible standard for
debate” and was therefore not void for vagueness (at para-
graph 38). Similarly, these words were held by the Court not
to be overly broad. The Court expressed the basis for this
conclusion in the following manner (at paragraph 41):
8. Section one of the Charter states: “The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982. 
The Supreme
Court . . . 
indicated that a
judge . . . must
before denying
release . . . “be
satisfied that
detention is not
only advisable
but necessary.”
s. 515(6) — that the deten-
tion of the accused is justified
to maintain confidence in the
administration of justice.
This constituted a monu-
mental shift in the law of bail
in Canada.  In R. v. A.A.C.,
[2015] 2015 ONCA 483
(Can. Ont.) for instance, the
Ontario Court of Appeal indi-
cated that in St-Cloud, the
Supreme Court rejected “an
unduly restrictive interpreta-
tion of the section’s scope and
holds that the tertiary ground
for detention is not to be
interpreted narrowly or
applied sparingly” (at para-
graph 47).
The Supreme Court also indicated in St-Cloud, at para-
graph 69, that:
The four listed circumstances are simply the main fac-
tors to be balanced by the justice, together with any
other relevant factors, in determining whether, in the
case before him or her, detention is necessary in order to
achieve the purpose of maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice in the country. This is the pro-
vision’s purpose. Although the justice must consider all
the circumstances of the case and engage in a balancing
exercise, this is the ultimate question the justice must
answer, and it must therefore guide him or her in mak-
ing a determination.
Subsequently in Oland, the Supreme Court indicated that
in assessing public confidence concerns pursuant to section
515(10)(c), “the seriousness of the crime plays an important
role. The more serious the crime, the greater the risk that
public confidence in the administration of justice will be
undermined if the accused is released on bail pending trial”
(at paragraph 37).  Similarly in St-Cloud the Supreme Court
concluded (at paragraph 88):  “In conclusion, if the crime is
serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence
against the accused and if the victim or victims were vulner-
able, [pretrial] detention will usually be ordered.”
THE LADDER PRINCIPLE
Sections 515(2)(a) to (e) of the Criminal Code set out the
forms of release available to a judge conducting a bail hearing.
It is often referred to as the “ladder principle” because it begins
with release on “such conditions as the justice directs” and
ends with section 515(2)(e), which allows a bail judge to
order, if the accused is from out of the province or does not
ordinarily reside within two hundred kilometers of the place in
which he or she is in custody, that the accused be released with
sureties and/or a cash deposit. 
In Antic, the Supreme Court of Canada considered this pro-
vision.  In Antic, the accused was charged with several
offences.  He was denied judicial interim release at the trial
level.  On review, the reviewing judge indicated that he would
have released the accused if he could have imposed both a
surety and a cash deposit as release conditions but section
515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code did not apply. On a second
application for review, the bail review judge held that the geo-
graphical limitation in section 515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code
violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just
cause under section 11(e) of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court reversed the declaration that section
515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.  The
Supreme Court noted that “[s]ection 515(2)(e) did not have
the effect of denying Mr. Antic bail — it was the bail review
judge’s misapplication of the bail provisions that did so”
because “Mr. Antic had offered to provide sureties with a mon-
etary pledge. . . . He could have been released without a cash
deposit” (at paragraphs 3-5).
As regards the “ladder principle,” the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Antic that:
The ladder principle is codified in s. 515(3), which
prohibits a justice or a judge from imposing a more oner-
ous form of release unless the Crown shows why a less
onerous form is inappropriate: “The justice shall not
make an order under any of paragraphs (2)(b) to (e)
unless the prosecution shows cause why an order under
the immediately preceding paragraph should not be
made’” (at paragraph 47).9
The Supreme Court concluded in Antic that the application
judge made two errors (at paragraphs 52 to 54):
First, the bail review judge failed to apply the ladder
principle properly. Although he purported to apply it, he
erred by insisting on cash despite the existence of other
forms of release. The bail review judge was fixated on a
cash deposit because he believed the erroneous assump-
tion that cash is more coercive than a pledge. But, as I
explained above, a recognizance is functionally equiva-
lent to cash bail and has the same coercive effect. The
bail review judge should not have insisted on a cash
deposit where the accused could have entered into a rec-
ognizance with a surety (the effect of which is that the
surety joins in acknowledging the debt to the Crown).
The bail review judge’s second error may in fact have
influenced the first. He expressed concern that the “pull
of bail” would not be strong enough without a cash
deposit. Because the proposed surety was an elderly
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woman, the bail review judge was concerned that Mr.
Antic might believe that a forfeiture proceeding would
not be taken against her if he breached his bail terms.
The bail review judge erred in making his decision on
the basis of such conjecture. A justice or a judge cannot
impose a more onerous form of release solely because he
or she speculates that the accused will not believe in the
enforceability of a surety or a pledge. The bail system is
based on the promises to attend court made by accused
persons and on their belief in the consequences that will
follow if such promises are broken. As Rosenberg J.A.
rightly observed, “if accused came to believe that they
could fail to attend court without their sureties suffering
any penalty, the surety system would be ineffective.
(Citation omitted.)” 
CONCLUSION
As illustrated the Supreme Court of Canada has considered
numerous aspects of the law of bail in Canada.  The Court has
assessed and explained the constitutional context of bail in
Canada, and it has conclusively set out the manner in which
bail is to be considered by bail judges.  In the long term, the
most significant impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s deci-
sions on bail may be the importance it has placed upon avoid-
ing pretrial detention based solely on financial means.
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lished. Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
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During the Supreme Court’s October 2016 Term, newsrelating to Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency—including his successful nomination of Neil Gorsuch to
fill the vacancy created by Justice Antonin Scalia’s death more
than one politically eventful year earlier—frequently over-
shadowed news of the Court’s rulings. The Court itself con-
tributed to that redirection of the nation’s attention: it decided
more than 30 fewer cases than its recent average, and it
achieved unanimity at an unusually high rate.1 With 68% of
the Court’s rulings falling on the civil side of the ledger,2 how-
ever, we have much here to discuss, with significant new rul-
ings in the areas of arbitration, debt collection, disabilities and
education, discovery sanctions, equal protection, fair housing,
false claims, family law and veterans benefits, jurisdiction,
patents, religion, sovereign immunity, speech, takings, and the
Trump Administration’s “travel ban.”
ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court’s long-running campaign to bring state
courts into compliance with the Federal Arbitration Act con-
tinued this past Term with its ruling in Kindred Nursing Centers
Limited Partnership v. Clark.3 Exercising their respective pow-
ers of attorney, Janis Clark and Beverly Wellner had completed
the paperwork necessary to move family members into a Ken-
tucky nursing home. The contracts with the nursing home
stated that all controversies concerning the family members’
stay at the facility would be resolved through binding arbitra-
tion, rather than through litigation. When the family members
died not long thereafter, Clark and Wellner brought suits
against the nursing home on behalf of the decedents’ estates.
Were those suits contractually barred? The Kentucky Supreme
Court held they were not. A power of attorney does not
empower a representative to enter into an arbitration agree-
ment, Kentucky’s high court reasoned, unless it contains a
statement explicitly conferring that authority. Otherwise, the
Kentucky justices said, agents could waive their principals’
core constitutional rights of access to the courts and trial by
jury.
Led by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously reversed. In a
prior ruling concerning the FAA’s requirements, the Court had
explained that “courts must place arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts” and that arbitration agree-
ments thus cannot be invalidated “by defenses that apply only
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”4 Justice Kagan explained that
the Kentucky Supreme Court had violated these principles
when it held that, absent a clear statement to the contrary, a
power-of-attorney contract cannot confer the power to waive a
principal’s right to sue or to invoke his or her right to a jury
trial. “Such a rule is too tailor-made to arbitration agreements—
subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to uncommon
barriers—” Justice Kagan wrote, “to survive the FAA’s edict
against singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.”5
DEBT COLLECTION
The Court handed down two significant rulings this Term
on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. In his first opinion
for the Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch led his colleagues in unan-
imously rejecting a claim brought by debtors who believed that
their rights under the Act had been violated. The case, Henson
v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.,6 featured a debt collector—
Santander—that had purchased defaulted auto loans from Citi-
Financial Auto and then deployed collection methods that the
debtors found legally objectionable. The Act places method-
ological restraints upon (among others) anyone “who regularly
collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . .
another.”7 The parties agreed that the statute applies to agents
who attempt to collect debts on behalf of creditors, and they
also agreed that the statute does not ordinarily apply to those
who attempt to collect debts that they themselves originated.
But what about someone who—like Santander—purchases
debts originated by others and then seeks to recover on those
debts for its own financial benefit?
“[B]y its plain terms,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, the statutory
language at issue brings within the Act’s scope “third party col-
lection agents working for a debt owner—not . . . a debt owner
seeking to collect debts for itself.”8 This is true, Justice Gor-
such said, regardless of whether the debt owner “originated the
debt or came by it only through a later purchase.” As for the
debtors’ argument that Congress would have wished to bring
the Act to bear on debt purchasers if it had known that this
“new industry would blossom,” Justice Gorsuch stressed that
“it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory
text under the banner of speculation about what Congress
might have done had it faced a question that, on everyone’s
account, it never faced.”9
Suppose a debt collector asserts a right to be paid on a
credit-card debt and that, on the face of the claim, it is clear
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that the statute of limitations for collecting the debt has
expired. Does the assertion of the claim amount to a “false,
deceptive, or misleading representation” or an “unfair or
unconscionable means” of attempting to collect a debt, in vio-
lation of the Act?10 In Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson,11 the
Court held that such a claim does not violate the federal statute
when the claim is asserted in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceed-
ings. In that context, Justice Breyer reasoned for the majority,
there are a variety of protections that help to ensure that the
patently stale claim will be rejected. The Court reserved judg-
ment, however, on whether the Act bars “a debt collector’s
assertion in a civil suit of a claim known to be stale”— a setting
in which a consumer might easily be duped into paying a time-
barred debt in order to avoid litigation.12 Joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing that
a debt collector violates the Act when it attempts to collect a
debt that it knows is time-barred. Faced with a contrary ruling
by a majority of their colleagues, the dissenting justices urged
Congress to amend the legislation.
DISABILITIES AND EDUCATION
Through a variety of federal statutes, Congress has aimed to
protect the interests of children with disabilities. Prominent
among those statutes are the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. A provision of the
IDEA—20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)—states that, even if suing under a
statute other than the IDEA, a disabled child must first exhaust
the IDEA’s administrative procedures if he or she is “seeking
relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” The Court was
asked to interpret the meaning of that exhaustion provision in
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools.13 A child with cerebral
palsy had sued a school after it refused to allow her to bring
her service dog on the premises. The child sued under Title II
of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but did
not first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Was the
failure to exhaust a problem?
Pointing out that the IDEA’s “principal command” is that
disabled children be provided with what the statute describes
as “a free appropriate public education” (commonly called a
FAPE),14 Justice Kagan explained in her opinion for the Court
that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements only apply when “the
gravamen” of the plaintiff’s complaint concerns a school’s
alleged failure to provide a FAPE.15 To help lower courts deter-
mine whether a given complaint fits that description, Justice
Kagan offered a couple of diagnostic questions:
First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the
same claim if the alleged con-
duct had occurred at a public
facility that was not a
school—say, a public theater
or library? And second, could
an adult at the school—say,
an employee or visitor—have
pressed essentially the same
grievance? When the answer
to those questions is yes, a
complaint that does not
expressly allege the denial of
a FAPE is also unlikely to be
truly about that subject [and so the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirements will not apply].16
The Court remanded for an application of those principles.
Joined by Justice Thomas in a short opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito worried that the
majority’s two diagnostic questions would confuse the lower
courts. Those questions, Justice Alito wrote, evidently presume
that “there is no overlap between the relief available under” the
IDEA, on the one hand, and the relief available under the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act, or some other federal law, on the other.17
During his Senate confirmation hearings for a seat on the
Court, then-Judge Gorsuch took some heat from critics18 for
authoring a Tenth Circuit opinion stating that, to satisfy the
FAPE requirements of the IDEA, the educational benefits being
provided to a disabled student by a school “must merely be
‘more than de minimis.’”19 That criticism was not altogether fair;
as the internal quotation marks in the prior sentence indicate,
Gorsuch was invoking the standard previously adopted by the
Tenth Circuit, although it also is true that he added the word
“merely” to the formulation. With or without that adverbial
modifier, the Tenth Circuit’s standard is no longer good law. 
In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-120—a case
concerning a Tenth Circuit ruling in which Gorsuch did not
participate, but in which his framing of the Tenth Circuit’s
standard had been deployed—the Court unanimously held
that the Tenth Circuit had failed to interpret the IDEA and the
Court’s own precedent appropriately. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts explained that, to satisfy the IDEA’s man-
date, “a school must offer an [individualized education pro-
gram, or ‘IEP’] reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”21
Although an IEP need not be “ideal,” Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, it “must aim to enable the child to make progress” and
thus must be “constructed only after careful consideration of
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the child’s present levels of
achievement, disability, and
potential for growth.”22 By
requiring that a disabled child’s
educational program be “appro-
priately ambitious in light of
his circumstances,” the IDEA
imposes a requirement that “is
markedly more demanding
than the ‘merely more than de
minimis’ test applied by the
Tenth Circuit.”23
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Imagine you are a federal judge presiding over a tort lawsuit
in which the plaintiffs allege that a defective tire manufactured
by the defendant caused their motorhome to crash. After sev-
eral years of discovery, the parties settle. Months later, the
plaintiffs learn that—despite discovery requests that were
squarely on point—the defendant had concealed internal test
results indicating that the tire grew unusually hot at highways
speeds. The plaintiffs return to your courtroom, urging you to
order the defendant to pay all of the attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs that the plaintiffs incurred after the defendant’s
first refusal to disclose the test results. Does your inherent
power to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct extend
that far?
That was the question before the Court in Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Haeger.24 The district court in that case had
awarded the plaintiffs $2.7 million, covering all of the fees and
costs that the plaintiffs had paid after Goodyear’s first dishon-
est response to a discovery request concerning Goodyear’s
internal tests on the G159 tire model. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Draw-
ing heavily from the Court’s 1994 ruling in Mine Workers v.
Bagwell,25 Justice Kagan explained that—regardless of whether
a court is imposing sanctions pursuant to a rule of civil proce-
dure, 28 U.S.C.§ 1927, or the court’s inherent sanctioning
authority—sanctions “must be compensatory rather than
punitive in nature.”26 “[P]retty much by definition,” Justice
Kagan wrote, that means that a “court can shift only those
attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue.”27
When making that causal assessment, a district court has con-
siderable discretion. If presented with an “exceptional” case,
for example, the but-for standard “permits a trial court to shift
all of a party’s fees, from either the start or some midpoint of a
suit, in one fell swoop.”28 In this particular case, however, the
record did not support a finding “that disclosure of the heat-
test results would have led straightaway to a settlement.”29
Notwithstanding the internal test results, Goodyear still could
have argued that the plaintiff’s tire failed for reasons attribut-
able to the plaintiffs themselves (such as failing to replace it
after it had worn down), and, in a separate lawsuit concerning
a G159 tire, Goodyear had disclosed the test results and nev-
ertheless proceeded to trial. The court thus remanded for
application of the proper analysis.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Immigration
For more than half a century, the nation’s immigration laws
treated unwed U.S. citizen mothers significantly more favor-
ably than it treated (and still treats today) unwed U.S. citizen
fathers in determining the citizenship of children born abroad.
For such a father to transfer American citizenship to his child,
he must have resided in the United States for five or more years
before the child’s birth, and at least two of those years must
come after the father reaches the age of fourteen. For a child
born abroad to a U.S. citizen father before November 14, 1986,
the requirement is even more demanding: the father must have
resided in the United States for ten or more years prior to the
child’s birth, with at least five of those years coming after the
father reached the age of fourteen. If a child was born abroad
to an unwed U.S. citizen mother, however—whether before or
after 1986—the statutory requirement was far more lenient:
the child became an American citizen so long as the mother
had resided in the United States for at least one year prior to
the child’s birth.
The Court declared that arrangement unconstitutional in
Sessions v. Morales-Santana,30 though the news for the claimant
in that case was nevertheless ultimately unfavorable. Luis
Ramón Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic
in 1962 to unwed parents. Morales-Santana’s father—but not
his mother—was an American citizen. Yet Morales-Santana’s
father had fallen twenty days short of meeting the lengthy,
statutorily imposed residence requirement for obtaining Amer-
ican citizenship for his son. Later facing deportation as a result
of criminal convictions, Morales-Santana challenged the
statute’s differing treatment of unwed mothers and fathers,
contending that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal pro-
tection principles.
Led by Justice Ginsburg, a majority of the Court agreed.31
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court found that the
statute’s distinction between mothers and fathers lacked the
necessary “exceedingly persuasive justification.”32 The Court
concluded that the distinction—first drawn in the mid-twenti-
eth century—was the result of an anachronistic assumption
that mothers are children’s primary guardians and that fathers
commonly play little or no role in shaping children’s values
and civic attachments:
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Fearing that a foreign-born child could turn out more
alien than American in character, the [Franklin Delano
Roosevelt] administration believed that a citizen parent
with lengthy ties to the United States would counteract
the influence of the alien parent. Concern about the
attachment of foreign-born children to the United States
explains the treatment of unwed citizen fathers, who,
according to the familiar stereotype, would care little
about, and have scant contact with, their nonmarital
children. For unwed citizen mothers, however, there
was no need for a prolonged residency prophylactic: The
alien father, who might transmit foreign ways, was pre-
sumptively out of the picture.33
The Court’s ruling on the merits of Morales-Santana’s claim
left the justices with a choice: should they extend the benefits
of the one-year residence requirement to children born abroad
to unwed U.S. citizen fathers (as Morales-Santana desired), or
should they instead declare that children born abroad to
unwed U.S. citizen mothers become American citizens only if
their mothers meet the lengthier residence requirement previ-
ously imposed only on fathers? The Court chose the latter
option. The decision hinged, Justice Ginsburg explained, on
what Congress would have desired if it had known that its
mother-father distinction would be struck down as unconsti-
tutional. The Court found that “all indicators” suggest Con-
gress would have wished to retain the lengthier residence
requirement.34 Morales-Santana himself thus failed to benefit
from the Court’s ruling.35
Legislative Redistricting
The Court handed down several important rulings this Term
concerning the Equal Protection Clause and legislative redis-
tricting. First up was Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections,36
in which the Court clarified a portion of the analysis that
applies when determining whether a state permissibly took race
into account when drawing the boundaries of its legislative dis-
tricts. Virginia conceded that, when setting the boundaries of
eleven of its districts in the wake of the 2010 census, one of its
goals was to ensure that each of those districts would have a
black voting-age population of at least 55%. Such action will
draw strict scrutiny if race was the predominant factor that the
state used when placing voters inside or outside the challenged
districts. Was it? The lower court held that race was not the pre-
dominant factor because the eleven districts’ boundaries could
have been drawn in precisely the same way using traditional,
constitutionally permissible criteria. 
Led by Justice Kennedy, the 6-2 Court reversed and
remanded. “The racial predominance inquiry concerns the
actual considerations that pro-
vided the essential basis for the
lines drawn,” Justice Kennedy
explained, “not post hoc justifi-
cations the legislature in theory
could have used but in reality
did not.”37 Of course, when the
placement of districts’ lines does
conflict with traditional criteria,
it might be quite easy for a chal-
lenger to establish an equal-pro-
tection claim. But “a conflict or
inconsistency between the
enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a
threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order
for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymander-
ing.”38 Rather than find that race did predominate here and
that strict scrutiny was thus appropriate, the Court remanded
for an application of the proper legal analysis. Given the state’s
admission that it tried to ensure a black voting-age population
of at least 55%, Justices Alito and Thomas would have held
that race did indeed predominate and that strict scrutiny
should apply.39
The second of the Court’s redistricting cases this Term was
Cooper v. Harris,40 a case concerning North Carolina’s District
1 and District 12. Neither of those districts had a majority
black voting-age population before redistricting, but both of
them routinely elected candidates favored by a majority of
black voters. The state added a substantial number of African-
American voters to both districts, pushing their black voting-
age populations beyond 50%. In an effort to rebut allegations
of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, North Carolina
officials argued that the changes to District 1 were necessary to
comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and that race had
not played a predominant role in the selection of voters for
District 12. A three-judge district court rejected both of those
defenses. Led by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court affirmed.
With respect to District 1, the evidence made it clear that
those leading the redistricting effort wished to create a major-
ity-minority district, and so the Court quickly turned its atten-
tion to whether there was a compelling justification for taking
race predominantly into account. North Carolina argued that
there was—namely, avoiding vote dilution in violation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In election after election in District
1, however, numerous white voters had helped elect candi-
dates favored by most blacks, and so the state did not have
“good reasons” to fear that blacks’ voting strength in that dis-
trict was at risk of dilution.41 With respect to District 12—a
storied district making its fifth appearance before the Court—
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the state argued that partisan-
ship, rather than race, had been
the basis for drawing the dis-
trict’s lines, and that lawmakers
had simply opted to pack that
district with Democrats.
Reviewing the district court’s
contrary factual findings only
for clear error, the Court
rejected the state’s argument.
The redistricting plan’s lead
architects had said at various
points that they were focusing
on race, for example, and one
expert witness concluded that
race, rather than partisanship, far better explained the state’s
choice of district lines.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, Justice
Alito concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.
He agreed that North Carolina violated the Equal Protection
Clause when redrawing District 1’s boundaries, but accepted
the state’s party-focused explanation of its reasons for redraw-
ing District 12. On behalf of the majority, Justice Kagan replied
that Justice Alito had ignored the clear-error standard of review
and that his opinion “tracks, top-to-bottom and point-for-
point, the testimony of . . . the State’s star witness at trial—so
much so that the dissent could just have block-quoted that
portion of the transcript and saved itself a fair bit of trouble.”42
North Carolina v. Covington43 was another racial gerryman-
dering case from the Tar Heel State, this one featuring a district
court’s finding that state officials had unconstitutionally drawn
twenty-eight legislative districts’ boundaries along racial lines.
In a separate order, the Court summarily affirmed the district
court’s ruling on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.44 In this per
curiam ruling handed down the same day, however, the Court
unanimously vacated the district court’s remedial order. In
addition to setting a deadline by which new legislative bound-
aries needed to be drawn, the district court had ordered that
the two-year terms of certain legislators be cut in half, had
ordered that special elections be held for specified legislative
seats, and had partially suspended the North Carolina Consti-
tution’s requirement that a legislative candidate live for one
year in a district before being elected to represent it. Without
taking a position on whether those remedial measures were
justified, the Court held that, before imposing those remedies,
the district court needed to engage in a more thorough, case-
specific analysis of the equitable considerations at stake. 
Same-Sex Marriage
Two years ago, in one of its most widely noted rulings of the
past half century, the Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges45 that
the Fourteenth Amendment—through a combination of equal-
protection and substantive-due-process principles—grants
same-sex couples the right to marry and to have their marriages
recognized in all states. On the closing day of its most recent
Term, the Court issued a 6-3 per curiam opinion summarily
reversing a ruling by the Arkansas Supreme Court concerning
same-sex marriages and birth certificates. When two women in
separate same-sex marriages gave birth in Arkansas, the
Arkansas Department of Public Health refused to list the non-
birth spouses as parents on the children’s birth certificates. The
Court ruled in Pavan v. Smith46 that this flatly violated Oberge-
fell’s declaration that states must provide same-sex couples with
“‘the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to mar-
riage.’”47 Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Gorsuch
dissented, arguing that the case merited full briefing and argu-
ment, that Obergefell had not squarely addressed the constitu-
tional propriety of birth-certificate regimes like Arkansas’s, and
that it was “very hard to see what [wa]s wrong with” the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s conclusion “that rational reasons
exist for a biology based birth registration regime.”48
FAIR HOUSING ACT
In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami,49 Miami officials
claimed that Bank of America and Wells Fargo had discrimi-
nated against Latino and African-American home-loan bor-
rowers in a variety of ways, and that this discrimination
resulted in lower tax revenues and higher municipal expenses
for the city. Could Miami bring an action against the two banks
under the Fair Housing Act? The answer to that question
turned on at least two things: whether the city’s claims fell
within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect
when enacting the FHA and whether the city’s harms had been
proximately caused by the banks’ alleged FHA violations. The
court answered the first of those two inquiries in the affirma-
tive and remanded the second for further consideration.50
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer reminded readers that,
when bringing a federal statutory claim, a federal plaintiff must
meet the standing requirements of Article III and must show
that it possesses a cause of action under the statute. To meet
the latter requirement, a plaintiff must show that its interests
at least arguably “‘fall within the zone of interests protected by
the law invoked.’”51 The FHA broadly permits suit by “any per-
son . . . who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice” or who “believes that [it] will be injured by
a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”52 By
using such capacious language, Justice Breyer wrote, Congress
extended the pool of potential FHA plaintiffs to the full limits
of what Article III allows.
With respect to causation, the Court was less definitive. The
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Eleventh Circuit had concluded that the city met the FHA’s
causation requirement by pleading injuries that were the fore-
seeable result of FHA violations. The Supreme Court found,
however, that the FHA is more demanding:
In the context of the FHA, foreseeability alone does
not ensure the close connection that proximate cause
requires. The housing market is interconnected with
economic and social life. A violation of the FHA may,
therefore, be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow
far beyond the defendant’s misconduct. Nothing in the
statute suggests that Congress intended to provide a
remedy wherever those ripples travel.53
But beyond indicating that there needed to be some kind of
“direct” connection between an alleged FHA violation and the
plaintiff’s harm, the court declined “to draw the precise bound-
aries of proximate cause under the FHA.”54 None of the courts
of appeals had yet addressed that issue, and so the Court opted
to give them the first shot at tackling it.
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act’s qui tam enforcement provision
enables a private party (a “relator”) to bring an FCA action on
behalf of the federal government against an individual whom
he or she believes has “knowingly present[ed to the govern-
ment] . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.”55 The FCA further states that “[t]he complaint shall
be filed in camera [and] shall remain under seal for at least 60
days.”56 In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel.
Rigsby57—a case concerning allegations that, in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, State Farm fraudulently tried to shift some
of its wind-insurance liabilities to the federal government—the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a violation of
the FCA’s seal requirement mandates dismissal of a relator’s
complaint. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court unani-
mously found that dismissal is not required, but rather is
among the remedies that a district court may deem appropri-
ate in its discretion.
FAMILY LAW AND VETERANS’ BENEFITS
Howell v. Howell58 concerned an issue that looms large when
dealing with the distribution of veterans’ benefits between
divorcing spouses. When John and Sandra Howell divorced in
1991, the divorce decree declared that Sandra would receive
half of John’s Air Force retirement pay. That arrangement was
permissible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’
Protection Act, which declares
that states may treat veterans’
“disposable retired pay” as com-
munity property divisible
between divorcing spouses.59
More than a decade later, the
Department of Veterans Affairs
determined that John suffered
from a partial disability resulting
from his military service, enti-
tling him to disability benefits.
Under federal law, however,
John could receive those disability benefits only if he agreed to
take a corresponding reduction in the retirement pay that he
and Sandra had been dividing.60 John agreed to that arrange-
ment, surely appreciating the fact that, unlike veterans’ ordi-
nary retirement pay, veterans’ disability benefits are statutorily
exempt from federal, state, and local taxation.61 Of course, by
making that choice, he reduced the amount of his monthly
retirement pay that Sandra received each month. Unhappy with
the cut in her monthly payments, Sandra asked an Arizona fam-
ily court to order John to make up the difference. The family
court agreed to do so and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
Led by Justice Breyer, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. As
the Court explained in 1989’s Mansell v. Mansell,62 Congress
has declared that states cannot treat as divisible community
property any amount of retirement pay that a veteran has
waived to receive disability benefits.63 (Congress has thereby
ensured that the financial benefits of disability payments go
entirely to the veteran himself or herself.) By ordering John to
make up for the reduction that his waiver had yielded in San-
dra’s share of the retirement pay, Justice Breyer explained, Ari-
zona’s courts tried to do what Congress has explicitly forbid-
den. Justice Breyer closed by “not[ing] that a family court,
when it first determines the value of a family’s assets, remains
free to take account of the contingency that some military
retirement pay might be waived, or . . . take account of reduc-
tions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for
spousal support.”64
JURISDICTION
The Court handed down several noteworthy cases this Term
concerning state and federal courts’ jurisdiction. In BNSF Rail-
way Co. v. Tyrrell,65 the Court held (over the lone dissent of
Justice Sotomayor) that the Montana Supreme Court erred
when it determined that the courts of that state could exercise
personal jurisdiction over BNSF Railway Company.66 The issue
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arose when two former BNSF
employees sued the company
in a Montana state court for
injuries they allegedly suffered
while on the job. Because the
employees’ claims did not flow
from actions occurring in
Montana, the inquiry focused
on general, rather than spe-
cific, jurisdiction. Relying par-
ticularly upon its 2014 ruling
in Daimler AG v. Bauman,67
Justice Ginsburg explained for
the Court that a state court
may take general jurisdiction
over a corporation without
fear of violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause only when the corporation is incorporated in that state,
when its principal place of business is in that state, or when
“‘exceptional’” circumstances indicate that the corporation’s
activities in that state are “‘so substantial and of such a nature
as to render the corporation at home in that State.’”68 BNSF did
own more than 2,000 miles of track in Montana and did
employ more than 2,000 employees there. But when consid-
ered against the backdrop of BNSF’s entire operations, those
facts were not sufficient to establish that BNSF was “‘essen-
tially at home’” in Montana.69 BNSF’s contacts with Montana
would suffice to establish specific personal jurisdiction in a
case concerning BNSF’s activities in Montana, but they were
not enough to create general personal jurisdiction there.
The focus shifted to specific jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California.70 In that case, nearly
680 individuals filed actions against Bristol-Myers Squibb in
California for injuries they allegedly suffered from taking the
defendant’s Plavix, a blood-thinning drug. Eighty-six of those
plaintiffs resided in California, and, as to them, there was no
jurisdictional question. The remainder of the plaintiffs, how-
ever, came from 33 other states. Did the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause permit California’s courts to take
specific jurisdiction of the non-Californians’ claims? The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that it did, reasoning that a
“sliding-scale approach” was appropriate: the greater the num-
ber of contacts between a defendant and a forum state, the
looser may be the connection between the defendant’s activi-
ties in the forum and the plaintiffs’ claims. Here, although Bris-
tol-Myers did not design, manufacture, package, or label Plavix
in California, it did have numerous other contacts with the
state, and the non-Californians’ claims were similar to those
filed by the California residents. For the California Supreme
Court, there thus was a sufficient, jurisdiction-establishing
connection between California and the activities giving rise to
the non-Californians’ claims.
Over the lone dissent of Justice Sotomayor (just as in BNSF
Railway), the Supreme Court rejected the California Supreme
Court’s framework and conclusion. Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Alito explained that California’s “sliding-scale” framework
was nothing more than “a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction.”71 The decisive factor cutting against jurisdiction
here was the fact that there simply was no connection between
California and the activities giving rise to the non-Californians’
claims. Those plaintiffs had not purchased, taken, or been
injured by Plavix in California, and the fact that their claims
were similar to claims filed by Californians was irrelevant. The
Court “le[ft] open the question whether the Fifth Amendment
imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal juris-
diction by a federal court.”72 Writing in dissent, Justice
Sotomayor argued that “there is nothing unfair about subject-
ing a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide
course of conduct that injures both forum residents and non-
residents alike,”73 and she warned that the majority’s ruling
would have justice-thwarting consequences in cases in which
a defendant has injured plaintiffs in numerous states.
In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,74 the Court turned its
attention to issues of standing and intervention of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Must a party seeking to
intervene under that rule independently meet Article III’s famil-
iar standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressabil-
ity if the existence of an Article III “case” or “controversy” has
already been established in the underlying litigation? Laroe
Estates had sought to intervene in litigation concerning a real-
estate development project that went south allegedly as a result
of unlawful actions by municipal officials in Chester, New York.
Like the original plaintiff, Laroe wished to assert a regulatory
takings claim against the town. The Second Circuit held that,
because the original plaintiff had standing under Article III,
Laroe did not itself need to satisfy Article III’s requirements. 
Resolving a circuit split on the relationship between Article
III and Rule 24(a), the justices vacated the Second Circuit’s
judgment. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito
began by reminding readers that, when a plaintiff brings an
action against a defendant in federal court, it must establish
Article III standing for each of its claims and for each form of
relief that it seeks. The same principle holds, Justice Alito
explained, when a case features multiple plaintiffs: “[a]t least
one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief
requested in the complaint.”75 The Court held that the same
logic applies when a party seeks to intervene under Rule 24(a):
“[A]n intervenor of right must have Article III standing in
order to pursue relief that is different from that which is sought
by a party with standing.”76 Laroe thus would need to meet
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Article III’s requirements if it was seeking “a money judgment
of its own running directly against the Town.”77 The Court
remanded for a determination of whether that was, indeed, the
form of relief that Laroe sought.
In Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.,78 the Court consid-
ered whether a statutory sue-and-be-sued clause regarding the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie May) gives
federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all
claims concerning Fannie May, or whether it merely gives Fan-
nie May the capacity to file lawsuits and to be sued by others.
The statutory language at issue authorizes Fannie May “to sue
and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.”79 Resolving a circuit
split, the Court unanimously determined that the statute does
not provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction. The
Court’s analysis turned primarily upon the statute’s use of the
phrase “any court of competent jurisdiction.” By virtue of that
language, Justice Sotomayor explained, the statute merely
“permits suit in any state or federal court already endowed
with subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit.”80
Suppose federal plaintiffs file claims on their own behalf
against a defendant, as well as claims on behalf of a class they
propose to represent. Suppose, further, that the district court
refuses to certify the class, after which the plaintiffs voluntar-
ily agree to the dismissal of their individual claims with preju-
dice but then appeal the denial of class certification. Does the
federal appellate court have jurisdiction? That was the ques-
tion before the Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker,81 in which
owners of Microsoft’s Xbox game console filed design-defect
claims on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of Xbox
owners. After the district court struck their class allegations—
the functional equivalent of denying a motion for class certifi-
cation—the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling on the
class claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit should take juris-
diction under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. That rule gives federal appellate courts the discretionary
power to take jurisdiction of orders granting or denying class
certification—interlocutory orders that ordinarily would oth-
erwise be appealable only under the stringent circumstances
described in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Ninth Circuit refused to
take the case, but the plaintiffs were undeterred. In an effort to
render the case appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—
the familiar statute that gives courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review district courts’ “final decisions”—the plaintiffs then
stipulated to the dismissal of their individual claims with prej-
udice and appealed the district court’s ruling striking their
class allegations. The Ninth Circuit determined that Section
1291 did indeed give it jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’
appeal. The court then ruled that the district court abused its
discretion when it struck the
plaintiffs’ class allegations.
All eight of the Court’s par-
ticipating justices rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s finding that it
had jurisdiction, though they
disagreed about the nature of
the error. Writing for the five-
member majority, Justice Gins-
burg determined that the Ninth
Circuit lacked jurisdiction
because the district court’s ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’
individual claims was not a “final decision” within the mean-
ing of Section 1291. To rule otherwise, Justice Ginsburg rea-
soned, would allow plaintiffs to manufacture finality in the
face of what is otherwise plainly an interlocutory ruling on
class certification, and would disrupt the balance of interests
struck in Rule 23(f). Concurring in the judgment and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ indi-
vidual claims was an appealable “final decision[]” within the
meaning of Section 1291, because that ruling left the district
court with no further work to do.82 Justice Thomas neverthe-
less found that the plaintiffs’ appeal failed to satisfy the case-
or-controversy requirements imposed by Article III. “[I]t has
long been the rule,” he wrote, “that a party may not appeal
from the voluntary dismissal of a claim, since the party con-
sented to the judgment against it.”83
PATENTS
It was a busy Term for the Court in the area of patents, and
a correspondingly unhappy Term for the Federal Circuit,
which suffered reversals in six of its seven cases reviewed by
the Court.84 We will take a short look at three of those rever-
sals. Perhaps the most important of them came in Impression
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,85 a case asking
whether a patent holder can use patent law to control the
downstream use of a product after the patent holder sells it.
Lexmark owns various patents for toner cartridges that it man-
ufactures and sells. It sells those cartridges at a discount if the
purchaser contractually agrees to return the empty cartridges
to Lexmark, rather than transferring them to another company
in the business of refilling and selling cartridges. Many Lex-
mark cartridges sold under those terms nevertheless found
their way into the hands of Impression Products, a company
that refills and sells other companies’ used toner cartridges.
Lexmark sued Impression Products for patent infringement,
arguing that, “because it expressly prohibited reuse and resale
of those cartridges, [Impression Products and other companies
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in the same line of work]
infringed the Lexmark patents
when they refurbished and
resold them.”86 The Federal Cir-
cuit held that Lexmark could sue
Impression Products for patent
infringement, but the Supreme
Court reversed. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts
explained that, while Lexmark
might have a breach-of-contract
action when a customer disre-
gards its promise to return an
empty cartridge to Lexmark,
Lexmark fully exhausts its patent
rights at the moment of sale. “A
patentee is free to set the price
and negotiate contracts with
purchasers,” Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, “but may not, ‘by virtue of his patent, control
the use or disposition’ of the product after ownership passes to
the purchaser.”87 The Court further held that the patent-
exhaustion rule applies to goods sold domestically and inter-
nationally alike.
In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,88 the Court was
asked to settle a disagreement about the meaning of Section
289 of the Patent Act, which imposes liability upon any person
who “sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to
which [a patented] design or colorable imitation has been
applied.”89 The Court unanimously held that, when dealing
with a multicomponent product, the phrase “article of manu-
facture” can refer either to the entire product or to a single
component of it. The Federal Circuit had thus erred when it
concluded that, as a remedy for Samsung’s infringement of
some of Apple’s design patents for the iPhone, Apple was nec-
essarily entitled to all of the profits Samsung had made from
sales of its infringing smartphones (rather than just to the prof-
its Samsung had made from sales of the infringing components
themselves). The Court left it to the Federal Circuit, on
remand, to determine “whether, for each of the design patents
at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smart-
phone, or a particular smartphone component.”90 Appearing as
an amicus, the United States had proposed a test for making
that determination, but the Court preferred not to make any
decision about the appropriate test in the absence of full brief-
ing on the issue.
The Federal Circuit suffered another reversal in Life Tech-
nologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.91 That case concerned Section
271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which imposes patent-infringe-
ment liability upon anyone who, from within the United
States, supplies “all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention” for combination outside the United
States.92 Life Technologies had shipped one component of a
five-component invention from the United States to the United
Kingdom, where the components were combined to make the
final patented product. Focusing on the statutory phrase “all or
a substantial portion,” the Federal Circuit had held that the
component supplied from within the United States was an
especially important piece of the patented puzzle, that the
component was thus a “substantial” piece of the puzzle, and
that Life Technologies had thus violated Section 271(f)(1). The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the meaning of the term
“substantial” in this context is quantitative, rather than quali-
tative, in nature, and that the statute “does not cover the sup-
ply of a single component of a multicomponent invention.”93
RELIGION
In one of its most widely anticipated rulings of the Term,
the Court held in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer94 that Missouri could not categorically exclude a
church-run daycare from competing for a state grant to resur-
face its playground. Through Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program,
the state offered a limited number of grants to help organiza-
tions resurface their playgrounds with material made from
recycled tires. In an effort to comply with its strong constitu-
tional commitment to the separation of church and state, how-
ever, Missouri disqualified all churches and other religious
organizations—including the Trinity Lutheran Church and its
daycare—from competing for one of the grants. Defending that
disqualification, the state relied heavily upon the Court’s 2004
ruling in Locke v. Davey,95 in which the Court ruled that the
State of Washington could refuse to provide scholarship funds
to a student pursuing a degree in devotional theology.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
ruled that Missouri’s categorical exclusion violated Trinity
Lutheran’s rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. In Locke, Chief Justice Roberts explained, the student
“was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use
the funds to prepare for the ministry.”96 Trinity Lutheran, how-
ever, had been denied the opportunity to compete for a grant
“because of what it is—a church.”97 In this important respect,
the Court found, Trinity Lutheran had suffered the same sta-
tus-based injury that had been declared unconstitutional in
1978’s McDaniel v. Paty.98 In that case, the Court struck down
a Tennessee law that categorically barred ministers from serv-
ing as delegates to the state’s constitutional convention.
In a footnote about which we undoubtedly will hear more
in the future, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]his case
involves express discrimination based on religious identity
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with respect to playground resurfacing,” and that the Court
was not “address[ing] religious uses of funding or other forms
of discrimination.”99 Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gor-
such refused to join that footnote (thereby reducing it to the
status of a plurality opinion), because it could provide a basis
for greatly restricting the precedential reach of the Court’s
opinion. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas wrote sep-
arately to express dissatisfaction with the Court’s prior ruling
in Locke—dissatisfaction that animated portions of Justice
Gorsuch’s separate opinion, as well.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, arguing that, just
as the Free Exercise Clause would not permit a state to deny
policy and fire protection to a church, so too it bars a state
from excluding churches “from participation in a general pro-
gram designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of
children.”100 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Sotomayor in dis-
sent, arguing that the Establishment Clause does not permit
Missouri to provide direct funding to Trinity Lutheran (just as
it would not permit the state to pay for repairs to the church’s
walls or pews), and that the Court’s ruling on the Free Exercise
Clause was faithful neither to Locke nor to much of the nation’s
legal history.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Court resolved two issues in memorably named Lewis
v. Clarke,101 one concerning the scope of tribal sovereign
immunity and the other concerning the doctrine of sovereign
immunity more generally. The issues arose from a simple set of
allegations. Brian and Michelle Lewis claimed that, while dri-
ving on Interstate 95 in Connecticut, they were rear-ended by
William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming
Authority who was driving customers of the Mohegan Sun
Casino to their homes. When the Lewises sued Clarke in his
individual capacity in a Connecticut state court, Clarke argued
he was protected by tribal sovereign immunity. He offered two
rationales for invoking that defense: he was acting within the
scope of his tribal duties at the time of the accident, and the
Mohegan Tribe had statutorily agreed to indemnify tribal gam-
ing employees for losses they suffered as a result of their neg-
ligent on-the-job conduct. The Connecticut Supreme Court
embraced the first rationale, but the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected both.
Writing for the Court,102 Justice Sotomayor first determined
that there was no reason to extend the sovereign-immunity
defense to tribal employees under circumstances in which the
defense would not extend to state and federal employees.
Under well-settled principles, Justice Sotomayor explained, the
availability of sovereign immunity as a defense turns in large
part on whether a governmental employee has been sued in his
or her official or individual capacity. Suits against employees in
their official capacities are really suits against their sovereign
employers, and so sovereign
immunity in in play. When an
employee has been sued in his
or her personal capacity, how-
ever, it is the employee—and
not the employer—that is the
real party in interest.
Justice Sotomayor next
observed that this case pre-
sented the Court with its first
opportunity “to decide whether
an indemnification clause is
sufficient to extend a sovereign
immunity defense to a suit
against an employee in his indi-
vidual capacity.”103 The Court
made short work of that question, answering it in the negative.
“The critical inquiry,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “is who may be
legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who will
ultimately pick up the tab.”104 In an individual-capacity law-
suit, a court’s judgment binds the employee, not the sovereign
employer—and that remains true even when the sovereign has
volunteered to make its employees whole for losses they suffer
as a result of negligently carrying out their job duties.
SPEECH
Those awaiting a major ruling concerning the intersection
of the Internet and the First Amendment’s Speech Clause got
at least part of what they wanted in Packingham v. North Car-
olina.105 Lester Packingham had posted a statement on Face-
book, thanking God that a court dismissed his traffic ticket.
The problem? As a convicted sex offender, Packingham was
barred by North Carolina law from accessing social network-
ing sites like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn (and possibly
also sites like Amazon, Washingtonpost.com, and WebMD). In
an opinion joined by the Court’s Democratic appointees, Jus-
tice Kennedy observed that cyberspace had joined streets and
parks as a key place where Americans routinely go to inquire,
speak, listen, learn, and protest. Turning to the intermediate
scrutiny appropriate for content-neutral speech regulations,
the Court found that the law burdened substantially more
speech than was necessary to achieve its goal of protecting
children from sexual abuse. The statute’s prohibition was
“unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it
burdens,” Justice Kennedy wrote, and “no case or holding of
this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach.”106
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito concurred in the judgment. Because North Carolina’s law
“precludes access to a large number of websites that are most
unlikely to facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a
child,”107 Justice Alito agreed that the statute burdened sub-
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stantially more speech than
necessary. He declined to join
the majority’s opinion, how-
ever, because Justice Kennedy
had appeared to equate the
Internet with streets and parks.
There are differences between
the Internet and physical
spaces, Justice Alito observed:
parents can monitor their chil-
dren’s physical locations and
in-person contacts more easily
than they can monitor their
kids’ Internet traffic, for exam-
ple, and criminals can cloak
themselves in anonymity more
easily online than they can in person. For Justice Alito, those
differences suggested that the Court should proceed cautiously
before appearing to indicate that the First Amendment restricts
states’ ability to regulate speech on the Internet just as vigor-
ously as it restricts their ability to regulate speech in traditional
public forums. Justice Kennedy agreed that caution was appro-
priate, but for him that caution ran largely in the opposite
direction: he worried that the Court would be too slow to
acknowledge all of the speech-facilitating implications of the
Internet revolution.
Packingham was not the Court’s only noteworthy decision
concerning the freedom of speech this year. In its sole affir-
mance of the Federal Circuit this Term, the Court agreed with
that court’s finding that a federal statute strayed into unconsti-
tutional territory when it authorized the government to with-
hold a trademark on the ground that it may “disparage . . . per-
sons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,
or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”108 In Matal v.
Tam,109 the Patent and Trademark Office had relied upon that
statute when refusing to register “The Slants” as an Asian
band’s trademark. The Federal Circuit found the statutory pro-
vision facially unconstitutional, and—led in part by Justice
Alito—the Supreme Court agreed. In a portion of the opinion
joined by all eight of the participating justices, Justice Alito
began by eviscerating the government’s suggestion that regis-
tered trademarks are government speech and thus beyond the
reach of First Amendment limitations. In a passage attracting
only a plurality, Justice Alito then found that, even if the case
was governed by the somewhat more relaxed scrutiny appro-
priate for regulations of commercial speech—a question the
plurality found unnecessary to resolve—the statutory language
here was plainly unconstitutional. The First Amendment does
not permit the government to restrict speech merely on the
ground that it will offend or demean people on the basis of
their race, ethnicity, sex, or other trait. Joined by Justices Gins-
burg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Kennedy concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment, finding that the statute
impermissibly discriminated based upon viewpoint.
TAKINGS
In Murr v. Wisconsin,110 the Court confronted a potentially
tricky question that sometimes arises when trying to deter-
mine whether a regulatory taking has occurred: When evaluat-
ing the extent to which government regulation has reduced the
value of an owner’s property, what is the unit of property on
which that analysis should focus? The facts in Murr illustrate
the problem. In successive years, siblings in the Murr family
together acquired two adjacent parcels of land in Wisconsin.
To help pay for improvements on one of the lots, the siblings
wished to sell the other. A Wisconsin regulation stated, how-
ever, that when adjacent lots were held under common owner-
ship, none of the lots could be separately sold or developed
unless it contained at least one acre of land suitable for devel-
opment. The lot that the siblings wished to sell did not meet
that requirement. Did the restriction amount to a compensable
taking under the Fifth Amendment? The answer to that ques-
tion depended largely on how one defined the property at
issue: should a court look at the diminution in value of the sin-
gle lot that the Murrs could not sell (in which case there likely
would be a taking), or should a court look instead at the
diminution in value of the two lots taken together?
Writing for the majority, and emphasizing that “[a] central
dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is
its flexibility,”111 Justice Kennedy concluded that what ulti-
mately mattered was the regulation’s impact on the value of the
two lots taken together. In reaching that conclusion, the
majority did not narrowly focus—as Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito, in dissent, would have had it—on
whether Wisconsin law continued to define the two lots as sep-
arate parcels of land. Rather, Justice Kennedy concluded that a
court should examine numerous factors:
These include the treatment of the land under state
and local law; the physical characteristics of the land;
and the prospective value of the regulated land. The
endeavor should determine whether reasonable expecta-
tions about property ownership would lead a landowner
to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one
parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts. The inquiry is
objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue
derive from background customs and the whole of the
legal tradition.112
After examining each of those factors, the Court concluded
that it should treat the Murr siblings’ two lots as a single par-
cel of land, and that no compensable taking had occurred.
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “TRAVEL BAN”
Laying the groundwork for what will likely be one of its
most significant rulings next Term, the Court in Trump v. Inter-
national Refugee Assistance Project113 agreed to review lower
courts’ decisions temporarily enjoining enforcement of the
Trump Administration’s “travel ban.” The executive order
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being challenged seeks to limit the flow of refugees into the
United States and (with case-by-case exceptions) seeks tem-
porarily to bar the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Oral arguments on those matters are
slated to be heard early in the Court’s October 2017 Term.
Pending its review, the Court partially granted the Govern-
ment’s request to stay enforcement of the lower courts’ injunc-
tions. Until the Court says otherwise, the injunctions remain
in place only for those who possess a “bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.”114 That is, the
injunctions are effective only for those who have either “a
close familial relationship” with a person in the United States
or a formal, documented relationship with an entity in the
United States (such as a student’s relationship with a univer-
sity, a worker’s relationship with an employer, or a lecturer’s
relationship with an audience). Joined by Justices Alito and
Gorsuch, Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in
part, arguing that the Court should have stayed the enforce-
ment of the injunctions in their entirety.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In McLane Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission,115 the Court determined that “a court of appeals
should review a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an
EEOC subpoena” for abuse of discretion, rather than de
novo.116
In Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.117—a case fea-
turing a copyright dispute between two makers of cheerleader
uniforms—the Court held that “a feature of the design of a
useful article is eligible for copyright if, when identified and
imagined apart from the useful article [as with the decorations
on the uniforms at issue here], it would qualify as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in
some other tangible medium.”118
Resolving a circuit split and a disagreement among the
members of the Texas Court of Appeals, the Court determined
in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon119 that the Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Matters (also known as the Hague Ser-
vice Convention) does not forbid the international service of
process by mail.
In Kokesh v. SEC,120 the Court resolved another circuit split
by unanimously holding that, when the Securities and
Exchange Commission orders disgorgement in an enforcement
proceeding, it is imposing a “penalty” within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 2462, and any such action for disgorgement thus
must be brought within the five-year period established by that
statutory provision. In a footnote, the Court cautioned readers
that it was not stating “an opinion on whether courts possess
authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceed-
ings,” but was instead only addressing the reach of Section
2462’s limitations period.121
In another securities case—California Public Employees’
Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.122—the Court ruled
that the three-year time bar established by Section 13 of the
Securities Act of 1933 is a statute of repose, rather than a
statute of limitations, and thus is not subject to equitable
tolling on behalf of investors who opt out of a timely filed
putative class action but fail to file their own complaints the
time bar.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, several politically charged cases
are looming especially large for the Court’s October 2017 Term:
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project123 and Trump v.
Hawaii,124 on the Trump Administration’s “travel ban”; Gill v.
Whitford,125 on partisan gerrymandering; and Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,126 on the
scope of a baker’s religious freedom to refuse to make wedding
cakes for same-sex couples. There will, of course, be a host of
others, on issues ranging from whether Iranian property on
loan to the University of Chicago can be seized to satisfy a
judgment against Iran arising out of a 1997 bombing in
Jerusalem,127 to whether Congress may bar the states from
repealing their bans on sports gambling.128
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Most judges, by necessity, work case by case, address-ing only the legal questions that must be decided tohandle that case. For many, there’s little opportunity
to reflect on how the law may change over time—either about
how and why those changes may occur or about whether such
changes are for the better. In this article, we analyze the links
between tort law and legal practice on the one hand and psy-
chological notions of justice on the other. We explore situa-
tions in which commonsense notions of justice have con-
verged with legal doctrine and legal practice in tort cases, cre-
ating changes in tort law, as well as circumstances in which tort
law and legal practice have diverged from commonsense jus-
tice. We think judges will enjoy having the chance to step back
from day-to-day case consideration to reflect on these intrigu-
ing patterns in tort law and practice.
In his book on commonsense justice and law, Norman
Finkel described a dispute at his university that arose each
spring. The grounds crew carefully maintained walking paths
in a grassy quad, but students ignored those paths and created
their own, romping along the once-beautiful grass until bare
earth began to show. The grounds crew reseeded, placing
“Keep Off” signs around the tender area. But the signs were
routinely ignored, and the new grass failed to thrive. Finally,
the grounds crew laid new sod on the bare earth just in time
for late spring graduation. The following spring, the cycle
repeated. Eventually, the grounds crew conformed their paths
to the improvised student paths, breaking this perennial cycle.
Finkel analogizes this dispute to the challenge raised by diver-
gence between law and commonsense ideas of justice, asking:
“Should the law follow the path laid by community sentiment,
or should the community follow the path the law has laid?”1
When it comes to tort law, we see much convergence
between the law and community sentiment—places where tort
doctrine and psychological intuition are aligned—with tort
law both reflecting and shaping community views of civil jus-
tice. Convergence is understandable, even to be expected in
many cases. Many societal and cultural expectations, values,
and norms are embedded in the form and content of laws. Over
time, commonly shared ideas of justice in torts are incorpo-
rated into specific legal rules.
However, we also see instances in which law and intuition
diverge. In some cases of divergence, it seems that the differing
assumptions of the law and the tendencies of human psychol-
ogy can quietly coexist. In other cases, the perceived legiti-
macy of the tort system may be undermined when the law
diverges from community sentiment. And in still others, psy-
chological tendencies may run counter to the legitimate pur-
poses of tort law.
CONVERGENCE
At the intersection of psychology and torts, we observe
many instances in which the two paths coincide, instances in
which psychological intuitions are in accord with the founda-
tional principles and rules of tort law.  One example of this pat-
tern is the shift from contributory to comparative negligence in
most jurisdictions. The classic 1809 English case of Butterfield
v. Forrester2 ushered in the English regime of contributory neg-
ligence, a legal doctrine that was quickly adopted in the United
States and proved to have considerable staying power. Many
defendants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
availed themselves of the defense of the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence. Proving that the plaintiff was even slightly at fault
in causing his or her own injury completely barred recovery.
But over time, the wisdom of refusing to hold negligent defen-
dants liable—particularly when their victims were much less at
fault than they were—was increasingly questioned. Such an
approach was hard to justify on either deterrence or compen-
sation grounds. Juries operating under a contributory negli-
gence regime reportedly practiced, under the table, a rough
version of comparative negligence. They were said to reject
defense verdicts in favor of reduced awards for negligent plain-
tiffs who contributed to their own injuries.
Eventually, the contributory negligence regime’s complete
bar to recovery fell out of favor. In most U.S. jurisdictions, it
was replaced with comparative negligence, an alternative that
reduces rather than bars recovery. When the negligence of both
the plaintiff and the defendant constitute legal causes of an
injury, lay observers favor responsibility and damages that are
proportionate to the responsibility of each party. The current
laws of most states are now in accord with this commonly held
community view of justice.3 Tort law has followed the path laid
by the community.
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Another example of the convergence between tort law and
psychological intuition comes from the rules of causation.
Consider the classic case of Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., the
“twin fires” case, in which two independent fires of roughly
equal size combined into a single fire and destroyed the plain-
tiff’s property.4 What makes such cases interesting is that they
cause problems for the standard rule for causation in tort law,
the “but-for” rule of causation. The difficulty lies in the fact
that even if only one of the fires had occurred, the plaintiff’s
property would still have been destroyed. Nevertheless, when
asked to evaluate causation in such cases of multiple sufficient
causation, people still tend to attribute causation to each of the
two causes (the fires). Or consider another situation involving
multiple sufficient causes in which two snipers simultaneously
fire at a victim, both shots hit their mark at the same time, and
either shot would have been sufficient to cause death. In such
a case, people tend to classify both snipers as causal, even
though a straightforward counterfactual analysis would indi-
cate that neither shooter is a but-for cause.5
This lay intuition is consistent with an exception to the but-
for rule of causation, as embodied in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, which provides that “[i]f multiple acts occur, each of
which . . . alone would have been a factual cause of the physi-
cal harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s),
each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”6 The com-
mentary to the Restatement affirms this intuitive connection:
Perhaps [the] most significant [justification for this
exception] is the recognition that, while the but-for stan-
dard . . . is a helpful method for identifying causes, it is
not the exclusive means for determining a factual cause.
Multiple sufficient causes are also factual causes because
we recognize them as such in our common understand-
ing of causation, even if the but-for standard does not.
Thus, the standard for causation in this Section com-
ports with deep-seated intuitions about causation and
fairness in attributing responsibility.7
Thus, both the shift from contributory to comparative neg-
ligence and the exceptions to but-for causation are consistent
with lay intuitions about causation.
DIVERGENCE
Yet in other instances, we see divergent paths, places in
which psychological predispositions are at odds with tort-law
principles. To continue an earlier example, although compara-
tive responsibility accords with current societal norms, some
states continue to employ contributory negligence regimes. In
four states and the District of
Columbia the plaintiff’s contribu-
tory negligence remains a com-
plete barrier to recovery.8 But
strict adherence to the legal
regime of contributory negligence
and its vestiges in modified forms
of comparative negligence can
produce results at odds with com-
monsense justice. These instances
may lead fact finders to engage in
motivated reasoning about the
evidence to arrive at a just result
in the case.
Consider an experiment that presented a product-design-
defect lawsuit to mock jurors. The case included evidence of
defective design, as well as testimony that supported an infer-
ence of plaintiff fault. One group of mock jurors was given
comparative negligence instructions, and asked to assess the
relative responsibility of the defendant and the plaintiff. Other
jurors were instructed to decide the case under contributory
negligence rules. Only 8 percent of those who received the
comparative negligence instructions concluded that the plain-
tiff was not at all responsible. In contrast, 24 percent of those
deciding under contributory-negligence instructions found
that the plaintiff was not at all at fault, a finding that permitted
recovery.9 In short, the jurors generously interpreted the facts
in the case to allow them to reach what they considered to be
a just result. 
This experimental study is consistent with analyses of out-
comes in real-world civil jury trials. Eli Best and John Dono-
hue examined two large national samples of civil jury trials
from 2001 and 2005, focusing on those cases in which the jury
attributed a percentage of negligence to the plaintiff.10 In pure
comparative-negligence jurisdictions, where partial recovery
was permitted even when plaintiff fault was greater than 50
percent, juries found that plaintiff responsibility exceeded 50
percent in 22 percent of the cases. In modified comparative-
negligence jurisdictions, where plaintiff recovery would be
barred if juries found that plaintiff responsibility exceeded a
threshold around 50 percent, relatively few juries (7.5 percent)
found the plaintiff’s responsibility to be above 50 percent.
Compared to their counterparts deciding cases in pure com-
parative-negligence jurisdictions, the juries in modified com-
parative-negligence jurisdictions found lower levels of plaintiff
responsibility (particularly in the 40–49 percent range, and at
exactly 50 percent), ensuring that plaintiffs would receive
some compensation for their injuries.11
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These studies suggest that
fact finders are motivated to
perceive, construe, and discuss
plaintiff responsibility in a way
that allows recovery when they
believe that recovery would be
just. Courts are sometimes sen-
sitive to this tendency. Con-
sider, for example, a decision
by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in which the court
adopted a modified form of the
comparative negligence rule
that bars the plaintiff’s recovery if the plaintiff is found to be 50
percent or more responsible. The court hesitated to credit a
jury’s 50–50 split of the responsibility to the plaintiff and the
defendant because the jury made the allocation without having
been instructed about the consequences of that allocation.12
The rules of contributory negligence and modified comparative
negligence, therefore, cause problems for the justice intuitions
of fact finders and may motivate them to find workarounds that
allow them to fulfill their concepts of justice.  
Another related instance in which the law and lay intuition
are at odds is in the calculation of damage awards in compara-
tive-negligence cases. The processes by which we ask jurors
and judges to make and report their comparative decisions and
to calculate final damage awards do not appear to comport
with the psychological tendencies of fact finders, ultimately
inviting what has come to be known as “double discounting.”
Consider what we ask fact finders to do when defendants
raise the plaintiff’s fault as a defense. Fact finders must first
determine whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving
that the defendant acted negligently and that such negligence
was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Then, they must
determine whether the defendant has met the burden of prov-
ing that the plaintiff acted negligently and that this negligence
was a legal cause of the injury. Next, fact finders must deter-
mine the percentages of responsibility that ought to be
assigned to the defendant and to the plaintiff. Separately, they
must calculate the total amount of damages suffered by the
plaintiff without regard to this division of responsibility. The
final step is the reduction of the total damage award by the per-
centage of plaintiff responsibility. In many jurisdictions, if the
fact finder is a jury, this final task is done by the court.
As we described above, fact finders may be motivated to
ensure some recovery to a plaintiff injured by a defendant’s
negligence, even when the plaintiff has also been negligent. At
the same time, however, the plaintiff’s comparative negligence
can work to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery beyond that con-
templated by the law.
Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park, and Peter Salovey conducted
a mock juror experiment using comparative negligence cases,
and found participants appeared to attribute more fault to
plaintiffs than was justified by the scenario facts.13 Mock jurors
read about the actions of both the defendant and the plaintiff
as well as the severity of the plaintiff’s injury in four accident
scenarios. Participants answered a series of questions about the
plaintiff and the defendant, and attributed percentages of fault
to both the plaintiff and the defendant. They were then asked
to give two damage awards—a gross damage award that repre-
sented the total damage associated with the injury and an
adjusted damage award that discounted the award to account
for plaintiff fault. In an actual jury trial, this adjustment for
plaintiff fault is typically done by the judge once the jury’s
damage award is submitted. 
As expected, high plaintiff responsibility led to a higher
apportionment of fault to the plaintiff. The damage awards,
however, showed a striking pattern. Recall that from a legal
perspective, the initial, unadjusted damage award should not
reflect a discount for plaintiff responsibility, but should repre-
sent the full cost of the plaintiff’s injuries. The adjustment
takes place afterwards, when the percentage of plaintiff fault is
taken into account and a proportionate amount is deducted
from the full compensatory award number to arrive at the
adjusted award. What Feigenson and his colleagues discov-
ered, however, was that the initial, unadjusted damage awards
were significantly lower in the conditions in which the plain-
tiff was described as also blameworthy. The award to the plain-
tiff, therefore, was discounted twice—once when jurors made
their initial valuation of the plaintiff’s total damages and again
when those damages were reduced to take account of the
plaintiff’s responsibility.
Researchers have also found evidence of double discounting
in patterns of real-world torts. In a study of automobile-acci-
dent cases, researchers found that initial damage assessments
were systematically lower in cases with partially negligent
plaintiffs, declining “almost in proportion to the plaintiff’s neg-
ligence.”14 The researchers concluded that “awards to negli-
gent plaintiffs are double discounted—the jury reports smaller
(gross) damages, which the court (or jury) further discounts in
accordance with the plaintiff’s negligence.”15
Psychologically, it is not surprising that participants would
reduce an award to take into account the plaintiff ’s responsi-
bility for his or her own injury. A holistic perspective that
takes relative responsibility into account is part of why com-
parative negligence seems fair to many observers. And we
have already seen the holistic approach that was said to be
practiced by juries who decided cases under regimes of con-
tributory negligence, with juries adjusting plaintiff responsi-
bility and awards downward rather than eliminating the pos-
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sibility of any recovery for negligent plaintiffs. 
It is reasonable to expect to find that the parties’ relative
responsibility contributes to the jurors’ underlying sense of
deserved damages.16 However, the structure imposed on the
fact finders’ decision making in comparative-negligence cases
results in double discounting. An initial reduction occurs
implicitly as fact finders calculate the total gross-damage-
award amount, and a second reduction occurs when the per-
centage of plaintiff responsibility is used to adjust the award
amount. In effect, the plaintiff is penalized twice for the same
negligent behavior.
How might judges manage the problem of double discount-
ing? Maine has adopted an interesting approach to the problem
of double discounting. In Maine, the judge instructs the jury to
return both an assessment of the total damages and an adjusted
damages figure. The judge informs the jury that it should
“reduce the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by per-
centage, to the extent deemed just and equitable, having regard
to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damages.”17
The judge reminds the jury that the lower figure will be the
final verdict. It would be interesting to study whether Maine’s
approach to comparative negligence is an effective way to
address the possibility of double discounting.
Divergence can also be seen in other areas. Imagine, for
example, a case alleging that a doctor was negligent in failing
to identify the presence of a cancerous tumor in a patient’s X-
ray. A recent scan clearly shows the tumor, and the patient
alleges that the doctor should have detected it in the earlier X-
ray as well. Had the cancer been detected earlier, the patient’s
prognosis would have been much better. The difficulty for the
fact finder (and for any medical experts called to testify) is that
the assessment of the earlier X-ray is inevitably conducted with
the knowledge now possessed—the fact that we now know
about the tumor.18
But legal determinations of whether particular conduct is
reasonable are supposed to be made from an ex ante perspec-
tive, judging the reasonableness of the conduct before the con-
sequences of the chosen action were known. As Prosser and
Keeton note,
The actor’s conduct must be judged in the light of the
possibilities apparent to him at the time, and not by
looking backward “with the wisdom born of the event.”
The standard is one of conduct, rather than of conse-
quences. It is not enough
that everyone can see now
that the risk was great, if it
was not apparent when the
conduct occurred.19
Research in psychology,
however, has demonstrated that
people have difficulty taking a
forward-looking perspective
when making judgments in
hindsight. The hindsight bias
makes it difficult to figure out
what predictions one would
have made in foresight.20 When
outcome information is known, other information about the
event can be reconstrued in light of that outcome, creating an
integrated picture of the event and its outcome that is hard to
disentangle and leading to a feeling that one “knew it all
along.” Of particular importance for tort law, people “not only
tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable, but
also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively inevitable’ before it
happened. People believe that others should have been able to
anticipate events much better than was actually the case.”21
A related phenomenon, the outcome bias, occurs when peo-
ple judge the quality of a decision based on its outcome. That
is, decisions resulting in negative consequences are judged to
have been bad decisions.22 Thus, for example, people tend to
judge the quality of the same medical decision more favorably
when the treatment turns out to be successful than when it
does not.23
Hindsight biases have implications for the types of judg-
ments and decisions required of experts and fact finders in tort
cases, as they will typically know that harm has in fact
occurred. Hindsight and outcome biases are likely to affect
judgments about the range of risks that were foreseeable,
whether a particular risk was foreseeable, the likelihood that a
particular risk would materialize, and estimates of the likely
severity of harm. In the aftermath of an injury, the risk of loss
is likely to seem significant and any precautions taken are
likely to seem less reasonable.
Experimental studies that have explored the hindsight bias
in the context of tort litigation support these predictions.
Susan LaBine and Gary LaBine, for example, compared judg-
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ments about therapists’ assess-
ments of patient dangerousness
in foresight and hindsight.
When mock jurors were told
that the patient became violent,
they rated the actions taken by
the therapist as being less rea-
sonable, were more likely to
believe that the therapist
should have done more, thought that the violence was more
foreseeable, and were more likely to believe that they would
have predicted violence themselves than did mock jurors who
did not have this hindsight information. Ultimately, mock
jurors were more likely to find that the therapist was negligent
when they were told that a violent outcome had occurred (24
percent) than when no violence resulted (6 percent) or when
the outcome was not specified (9 percent).24
A similar study compared judges’ evaluation of a physician’s
decision to grant a resident of a psychiatric ward permission to
leave the facility for three hours.  The resident then escaped
and caused significant harm.  Judges who were told of the dis-
astrous consequences thought that it was more foreseeable that
harm would occur than did judges who assessed the foresee-
ability of harm in foresight.  In addition, only 12 percent of
judges judging in foresight believed that the physician’s deci-
sion was negligent, while 30 percent of those judging in hind-
sight indicated that they believed that the physician’s decision
was negligent.25
The hindsight bias has proven to be difficult to overcome in
the legal context. Therefore, some scholars have suggested
bifurcating trials or otherwise structuring proceedings so that
fact finders do not know the specific consequences of the deci-
sion or conduct at issue, using a clear and convincing standard
for determining negligence, increasing reliance on strict liabil-
ity or the regulatory system, or allowing for increased defer-
ence to industry standards and practice guidelines.26
Others are more optimistic, noting aspects of the current
system that may work to minimize or offset hindsight bias.27
The most effective debiasing technique—considering alterna-
tives to the outcome that occurred—is inherent in an adver-
sarial system in which the other side often proposes an alter-
native scenario for fact finders to consider. Other tort system
features that may help are the existing reliance on deviation
from custom as evidence of negligence and the availability of
comparative-negligence rules. In addition, the hindsight effect
may be smaller in the kinds of situations that result in tort law-
suits. Negative outcomes, real-world events, and tasks that
require subjective assessments of the probability of risk tend to
produce weaker hindsight effects.28 Given that tort lawsuits
tend to involve real-world case scenarios that have resulted in
negative outcomes, that opposing sides present alternative
conceptualizations of the case, and that fact finders are not
required to provide numerical probability estimates, we might
expect attenuated hindsight effects in evaluations of legal
cases.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have described a number of instances in which the links
between tort law and practice have converged with lay intu-
itions of justice, and others in which they have diverged. Con-
vergence helps to explain the direction of shifts in tort law doc-
trine, where community sentiment helps to shape, and in turn
is shaped by, tort law. 
But when paths diverge, when public views and tort law do
not coincide, the legitimacy of the tort system may suffer as a
result. The legitimacy of the legal system, including the rules
and practices of tort law, depends a great deal on public accep-
tance. To the extent that the law departs from deeply held intu-
itions, tort law risks being perceived as illegitimate. Tom Tyler
has empirically examined the consequences of public support
or lack of support for legal authorities and the legal system,
investigating why people obey the law.29 Many of us might
assume that people obey the law because of the criminal pun-
ishments or civil consequences that come from violating it.
Indeed, this is the crux of the deterrence argument in tort law:
We establish civil sanctions to attempt to shape conduct in
desirable ways. 
Tyler argues, however, that a prime reason that most people
obey the law is that they believe in the law’s legitimacy. Com-
pliance with the law is linked to its moral credibility.  When
those in authority enact laws that are out of step with the pub-
lic’s sense of justice and fairness, the authorities and the legal
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system may lose credibility and legitimacy. Declining legiti-
macy, in turn, reduces a legal system’s ability to control con-
duct. Indeed, the dystopian image of tort law widely promul-
gated by tort-reform groups may already have led to decline in
public perceptions of the tort system’s legitimacy.
As we have described, legal decision makers may respond to
divergence between their views and the law through creative
fact finding and other mechanisms that allow them to achieve
what they consider to be justice in a particular case. People
may adjust their perceptions of the parties and the evidence so
that they align better with their ideas of a fair ultimate out-
come. Recall how perceptions of plaintiff fault are modified
under contributory fault regimes to permit some recovery for
the plaintiff even when strict adherence to the tort law rule
would lead to no recovery. In essence, people walk where they
want to, creating paths that serve their goals and taking small
detours to accommodate the formal letter of the law.
In some instances of divergence, however, taking psycho-
logical predispositions and social norms into account might
undermine the purposes of tort law. Consider the impact of
implicit racial bias, which may lead fact finders to devalue the
injuries of racial and ethnic minorities. Here, other important
social and political values lead us to insist that the community
must walk on the path laid by the law.
Psychologists have begun to study debiasing remedies, test-
ing the effectiveness of techniques aimed at limiting the impact
of psychological heuristics and other biases.30 Some hopeful
evidence of this is found in research on jury instructions about
damages. In general, legal instructions may be admonitions
that are akin to “Keep Off” signs, and may have similarly mod-
est effects. But legal instructions to jurors that include reasons
and explanations about the purposes of the law can be more
effective in helping jurors make decisions that are consistent
with the law, even when the law goes against their intuitions.31
Ultimately, psychological intuitions and the purposes of tort
law will interact to determine the path that tort law takes. At
times, convergence between psychology and tort law will fur-
ther the overall purposes of the tort system, deterring tortious
conduct and promoting just compensation. In other circum-
stances, the same policies of deterrence and compensation will
be better served by demanding that psychological intuitions be
put aside. In either case, understanding the relevant intuitions
and the many other ways that psychology influences the real
world of tort law and practice will make it more likely that the
tort system will find the best path.
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The question of a criminal defendant’s risk for futureoffending may be of interest to courts in a variety of con-texts. Courts may request or consider information from
forensic mental health professionals regarding risk assessment,
which is the formal appraisal of the probability that an
offender will reoffend or commit particular acts of violence in
the future.1 Risk assessment is relevant in criminal contexts
such as capital sentencing, criminal responsibility, and com-
mitment of sexually violent predators; it also arises in civil
contexts including civil commitment, workplace disability,
child custody, and child protection.2 In some instances, risk
assessment also may be done in cases involving risk of harm to
identifiable third parties.3 Despite its growing use in the United
States legal system in recent years, violence risk assessment has
historically come under critical scrutiny in U.S. courts. Such
concern about the practice of risk assessment and its eviden-
tiary value is appropriate, considering the consequences that
can be associated with a conclusion that an individual is high
risk. Such consequences might include, inter alia, longer sen-
tences or lost custody of a child.4
However, it is important that concerns about risk assess-
ment be accurate and current with respect to the supporting
science. As evidentiary gatekeepers, whether acting in accor-
dance with Daubert or Frye admissibility standards, the court
must be aware of the foundational scientific base of risk assess-
ment, and whether the practice is generally accepted in the
field. Other criticisms, however, may no longer be accurate, if
they ever were. The predictive accuracy of violence risk assess-
ment has been improved considerably through theoretical
advances, empirical research, and the development of special-
ized, structured risk-assessment measures over the last 25
years. This Article provides a primer for judges regarding these
advances. First, we review some of the historical criticisms of
risk assessment, including a recent criticism in a capital con-
text. Second, we discuss an important theoretical advance (the
risk-need-responsivity framework) through which forensic
mental health professionals currently conceptualize risk.
Third, we review the four most frequently observed
approaches to risk assessment: (1) clinical judgment, (2)
anamnestic assessment, (3) actuarial prediction, and (4) struc-
tured professional judgment (SPJ). Finally, we provide a criti-
cal analysis of each of these approaches and offer recommen-
dations for their application in legal contexts.
HISTORICAL CRITICISM OF RISK ASSESSMENT
Historically, risk assessment provided by mental health pro-
fessionals has been criticized as little better than chance in its
accuracy.5 Before the mid-1970s, forensic mental health pro-
fessionals were largely forced to rely on their own judgment,
without the assistance of specialized risk-assessment measures,
when appraising an individual’s level of risk.6 A series of stud-
ies in the 1970s revealed that mental health professionals who
used their own judgment in this way were mistaken in about
two-thirds of their predictions identifying those who would
commit future violence.7 More recent studies showed some
modest improvement in accuracy, but still identified errors in
nearly half (47%) of the cases in which mental health profes-
sionals used their judgment to identify those who would be
violent in the future.8 The majority of the errors were “false
positives”—individuals wrongly predicted to be violent in the
future. Mental health professionals were somewhat more accu-
rate in identifying those who would not be violent.
This very limited ability of psychiatrists and psychologists to
accurately appraise risk of future violence was part of the defen-
dant’s argument in the 1983 Supreme Court case Barefoot v.
Estelle.9 Defendant Thomas Barefoot challenged his conviction
for capital murder on several grounds, including the argument
that testimony by mental health professionals regarding an
individual’s future dangerousness should be inadmissible at
trial.10 Barefoot argued specifically that psychiatrists “individu-
ally, and as a class [were] not competent to predict future dan-
gerousness” and that any sentence predicated on such predic-
tions was so likely to be erroneous that it constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.11
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tion and rebuttal.” Second, as is clear from a review of the lit-
erature in the field, peer review of individual predictions is
rare, and peer review of making such predictions in general has
been uniformly negative. Third, the rate of error, at a mini-
mum, is fifty percent, meaning such predictions are wrong at
least half of the time. Fourth, standards controlling the opera-
tion of the technique are nonexistent. Overall, the theory that
scientific reliability underlies predictions of future dangerous-
ness has been uniformly rejected by the scientific community
absent those individuals who routinely testify to, and profit
from, predictions of dangerousness.
Id. (citations omitted).
17.Unstructured clinical judgment is the use of clinical judgment by
a mental health professional, without the assistance of specialized
risk-assessment measures or specific focus on violence history, to
reach an opinion about the likelihood that a defendant will
threaten or harm others in the future.
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It uses predictor variables that can be quantified or rated reliably.
Id. The predictor variables are empirically validated against the
outcome that is being predicted. Thus it involves an objective,
mechanistic, reproducible combination of predictive factors,
selected and validated through empirical research against known
outcomes. Id.
19.Structured professional judgment uses specified variables usually
developed from a review of the relevant research instead of col-
lected specifically for the development of an SPJ measure. These
variables are defined so they can be rated reliably. After complet-
ing the rating of variables, the SPJ evaluator considers the needs
for management, treatment, or supervision as part of the final
“structured professional judgment.” SPJ typically uses some risk
factors that are dynamic (potentially changeable through planned
intervention) rather than mostly static (unchanging through
planned intervention), as is more usual in actuarial assessment. 
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about a person’s history of violence. The individual is asked about
details associated with each prior violent act, such as thoughts,
feelings, those involved, the use of drugs or alcohol, the use of
weapons, the targeting of victim(s), and other details. MELTON ET
AL., supra note 4, at 307-08. The goal is to identify recurring risk
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future violence. 
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The defense was supported in this case by an amicus brief from
the American Psychiatric Association, which observed that psy-
chiatrists had no professional expertise in the prediction of
future dangerous behavior, and that such predictions were
likely to be inaccurate in a large majority of cases.12 The
Supreme Court, faced with considerable evidence that mental
health professionals could not provide consistently accurate
testimony regarding defendants’ future dangerousness, never-
theless held that barring such testimony would be like “disin-
venting the wheel,” and it should be evaluated for reliability by
the jury, not the court.13
The Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provided a different per-
spective on the use of the clinical judgment of mental health
professionals in providing expert evidence regarding a defen-
dant’s risk of future violent behavior.14 In Daubert, the Court
outlined five factors to consider in determining the reliability
and subsequent admissibility of scientific evidence: (1)
whether the scientific theory at issue had been tested, (2)
whether the theory had been subject to peer review and pub-
lication, (3) what the error rate for the theory was, (4)
whether scientific standards controlling the technique exist,
and (5) how much the theory in question has been accepted
by the scientific community.15 Applying these five factors
provides a much stronger argument that risk-assessment tes-
timony based only on clinical judgment should be inadmissi-
ble. For example, in Flores v. Johnson, though the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided the case
on other grounds, Judge Emilio Garza condemned risk
assessment based solely on clinical judgment in his concur-
rence, opining that the practice failed to satisfy any of the five
Daubert factors.16
As will be discussed later in this Article, risk assessment has
advanced considerably since the time it was based solely on
clinical judgment. It is now possible to identify four distinct
approaches to risk assessment in legal contexts: unstructured
clinical judgment,17 actuarial,18 structured professional judg-
ment,19 and anamnestic.20
Actuarial risk assessment has been criticized in legal con-
texts for its failure to account for changing individual circum-
stances. It also represents the ultimate form of “statistical” evi-
dence—not only individual items, but the scoring and combi-
nation of items to yield a conclusion by the measure, not the
user—and has been criticized on that basis as well. A recent
example of this criticism can be seen in the 2013 Virginia
Supreme Court case Lawlor v. Commonwealth.21 In Lawlor, the
defendant appealed his conviction for capital murder and sub-
sequent death sentence on multiple grounds, one of which was
the trial court’s exclusion of certain portions of the testimony
of psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham. The defense proffered
Dr. Cunningham’s testimony to rebut the Commonwealth’s
evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor and
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as mitigating evidence,22 and the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in exclud-
ing his testimony. The Virginia Supreme Court’s rationale was
that actuarial or statistical information of the type offered by
Dr. Cunningham is not satisfactorily individualized to the
defendant’s “character, history, and background.” In the court’s
words:
[C]haracteristics alone are not character.
Merely extracting a set of objective attributes
about the defendant and inserting them into
a statistical model created by compiling com-
parable attributes from others, to attempt to
predict the probability of the defendant’s
future behavior based on others’ past behav-
ior does not fulfill the requirement that evi-
dence be “peculiar to the defendant’s charac-
ter, history, and background…” To the con-
trary, it is mere “statistical speculation.”23
The Court elaborated that “the mere fact that an attribute is
shared by others from whom a statistical model has been com-
piled, and that the statistical model predicts certain behavior,
is neither relevant to the defendant’s character nor a founda-
tion for expert opinion.”24
Whether based on clinical judgment or specialized actuarial
measures, expert testimony on risk assessment has been criti-
cized by legal commentators. But much of this criticism stems
from a misunderstanding of the strengths and limitations of
various approaches to risk assessment. The next two sections
of this Article will address these points.
RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY AS A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
The development of the risk-need-responsivity (RNR)
framework represents a major conceptual advance in the field
of risk assessment. The RNR approach holds that risk-reduc-
ing rehabilitation should vary in focus, intensity, and duration
depending on an offender’s risk and criminogenic needs
(deficits that increase the risk of offending).25 It is based on
three principles: risk, need, and responsivity.26 The risk princi-
ple indicates that the intensity of treatment should vary
depending upon the individual’s risk level, with high-risk
offenders receiving more intensive treatment than lower-risk
offenders.27 The need principle directs the focus of interven-
22.The excluded testimony by Dr. Cunningham that the defense
hoped to proffer was as follows:
1. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
behavior pattern while [previously] in custody/incarceration,
impacts his future prison adaptability?
A: Because of Mark Lawlor’s prior adaption in prison and
jail, and particularly because of his lack of violent activity in
these settings, Mr. Lawlor represents a low likelihood of com-
mitting acts of violence while in prison.
2. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
age impacts his future prison adaptability? Does that opinion
take into account the fact that Mr. Lawlor committed his cur-
rent crime at age 43?
A: Because of Mark Lawlor’s age of 45 years old, Mr. Lawlor
represents a low likelihood of committing acts of violence
while in prison. The fact that Mr. Lawlor committed his cur-
rent offense at age 43 has been taken into account in forming
this opinion, but it does not change my opinion about his
future prison adaptability.
3. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
education impacts his future prison adaptability? Is this risk
factor predictive of violence in the free community as well?
A: The fact that Mr. Lawlor has earned his G.E.D. is predic-
tive of a low likelihood of committing acts of violence while in
prison. This risk factor is far more predictive of violent con-
duct in the prison context than it is in the free community con-
text.
4. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
employment history impacts his future prison adaptability?
A: Mark Lawlor’s employment history in the community is
predictive that Mr. Lawlor represents a low likelihood of com-
mitting acts of violence while in prison.
5. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
continued contact with his family and friends in the commu-
nity impacts his future prison adaptability?
A: Mark Lawlor’s continued contact with these individuals
while in prison, is predictive that Mr. Lawlor represents a low
likelihood of committing acts of violence while in prison.
6. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
past correctional appraisal impacts his future prison adaptabil-
ity?
A: Mark Lawlor’s past correctional appraisal is predictive
that Mr. Lawlor represents a low likelihood of committing acts
of violence while in prison.
7. Q: What is your expert opinion as to how Mark Lawlor’s
lack of gang affiliation impacts his future prison adaptability?
A: Mark Lawlor’s lack of gang affiliation is predictive that
Mr. Lawlor represents a low likelihood of committing acts of
violence while in prison.
8. Q: Have you reached an opinion, to a reasonable degree
of psychological certainty, based on all of the factors relevant
to your studies of prison risk assessment, as to what Mark
Lawlor’s risk level is for committing acts of violence while
incarcerated? And if so, what is your opinion?
A: Yes. It is my opinion based on my analysis of all of the
relevant risk factors which are specific to Mr. Lawlor’s prior
history and background, that Mr. Lawlor represents a very low
risk for committing acts of violence while incarcerated.
9. Q: Are all of your opinions concerning the above ques-
tions and answers about Mr. Lawlor, grounded in scientific
research and peer-reviewed scientific literature?
A: Yes.
Id. at 884-85.
23. Id. at 884 (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25.Leigh Harkins & Anthony R. Beech, A Review of the Factors that
Can Influence the Effectiveness of Sexual Offender Treatment: Risk,
Need, Responsivity, and Process Issues, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT
BEHAV. 615, 616 (2007).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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tions toward specific criminogenic deficits, which have also
been termed dynamic (modifiable through planned interven-
tion) risk factors.28 The responsivity principle indicates that
rehabilitative interventions should be tailored to the learning
style and ability level of the offender (specific responsivity)
and delivered using empirically supported methods (general
responsivity); these combine to make intervention more
accessible and effective, and promote treatment adherence.29
RNR was originally developed for use in correctional con-
texts, but it has clear application as well to questions before
the court at trial and sentencing.
There are eight key domains associated with risk of future
violent offending: (1) history of antisocial behavior, (2) anti-
social personality pattern, (3) antisocial cognition, (4) antiso-
cial associates, (5) family and/or marital trust, (6) school
and/or work, (7) leisure and/or recreation, and (8) substance
abuse.30 Of these, seven are dynamic and thus potentially
changeable. When they are modified through a reduction in
severity, this tends to reduce that individual’s risk. These needs
and their indicated interventions are summarized in Table 1.
The individual may also experience influences that either
reduce the risk from other influences (e.g., a young man with
family dysfunction, education problems, and antisocial peers is
employed working in a car-parts store by a responsible older
man who is also a role model) or increases the likelihood of
responsible behavior by itself (e.g., a young man is very gifted
musically, and spends most of his time practicing and per-
forming despite substantial family problems and a history of
substance abuse). Such “protective factors” make violence less
likely to occur.31 Protective factors may be static—for example,
high intelligence or having had a secure bond with caretakers
as a child.32 They may also be dynamic; examples include cop-
ing and problem-solving skills; self-control; strong motivation,
and a responsible, supportive social network.33
By identifying modifiable risk factors for violence, this
approach has promoted the development of risk assessment
measures that are both empirically testable and possess action
implications for risk reduction. Through the provision of sub-
stantial structure in risk assessment, moreover, these changes
have reduced bias and other sources of inaccuracy in risk
assessment by guiding judgments of risk using empirically
supported domains. The next section of this Article will
describe these newer approaches to risk assessment, as well as
review the unstructured clinical judgment and anamnestic
approaches to risk assessment, discussing the benefits and
detriments to each approach and their effectiveness in accu-
rately predicting an individual’s risk of future violence.
CURRENT APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT:
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
We now turn to a more in-depth description of three
approaches to risk assessment: actuarial, structured profes-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30.D. A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk and/or
Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 11 (2006).
31.See Brown & Singh, supra note 1, at 50. 
32.Michiel de Vries Robbe & Vivienne de Vogel, Protective Factors for
Violence Risk: Bringing Balance to Risk Assessment and Management,
in MANAGING CLINICAL RISK: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE PRACTICE 293,
294–95 (Caroline Logan & Lorraine Johnstone eds., 2012).
33. Id.
TABLE 1: MODIFIABLE RISK FACTORS (CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS)
Criminogenic Need Description Intervention
Antisocial personality pattern Pleasure focused, poor self-control,
aggressive
Teach/model problem-solving, anger-
management, and coping skills
Antisocial cognition Holding antisocial attitudes, values, and
beliefs, such as being supportive of crime
Promote alternative, prosocial thinking;
weaken criminal identity; strengthen
responsible identity
Antisocial associates Association with antisocial others or
non-association with prosocial others 
Reduce antisocial associations and increase
prosocial associations
Family and/or marital problems Problems with nurturance, caring/
monitoring, and supervision
Conflict reduction, relationship building,
improvement monitoring
School and/or work Poor performance, lack of opportunity,
or dissatisfaction with education and
work
Education, vocational training
Leisure and/or recreation Excessive leisure time, few antisocial
hobbies/pursuits, few organized activities
Increase involvement in prosocial pursuits
and organized activities to reduce leisure
time
Substance abuse Problematic use of drugs or alcohol Substance-abuse treatment and education
34.Stefanía Ægosdóttir et al., The Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment
Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clinical versus
Statistical Prediction, 34 COUNSEL. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-382
(2006); Seena Fazel et al., Use of Risk Assessment Instruments to
Predict Violence and Antisocial Behavior in 73 Samples Involving
24,827 People: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 345 BMJ 1
(2012); William M. Grove et al., Clinical versus Mechanical Predic-
tion: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19-30 (2000).
35.Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate
about Accuracy. 62 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 783, 783-792
(1994).
36.There are some cases for which a specialized risk-assessment mea-
sure is not available. In such cases, evaluators can “structure” their
risk assessment by using known risk factors for outcome of inter-
est. These risk factors may be derived from the scientific literature,
the individual’s history, or both.
37.HEILBRUN, supra note 2.
38.For an overview of meta-analysis, see Nancy K. Steblay, Meta-
Analysis as an Aid for Judicial Decision Making, 52 CT. REV. 120
(2016). 
39. James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism
among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis. 123 PSY-
CHOL. BULL., 123, 123-142 (1998).
sional judgment, and anamnestic. We do not discuss unstruc-
tured clinical judgment in detail for several reasons. First,
more than 50 years of research indicate that there is a consis-
tent advantage in accuracy in using structured approaches,
generally, in conducting risk assessment.34 Unstructured clini-
cal judgment is significantly less accurate than more-struc-
tured approaches.35 Second, it is this increased structure—
using predetermined questions, risk factors, and protective fac-
tors—that has promoted the substantial progress of the last 25
years in risk assessment, so unstructured clinical judgment is
no longer necessary or even appropriate as part of risk assess-
ment.36 There does remain a role for clinical judgment as part
of psychological evaluations for the courts more broadly, of
course, in such tasks as interviewing the evaluee and collateral
observers, interpreting data, and drawing conclusions.37 When
risk assessment is conducted as part of such an evaluation,
then professional judgment will continue to make an essential
contribution to the risk opinion. But there is a great deal of
structure guiding the judgment exercised under these circum-
stances, as it is informed by material that is directly related to
the probability of future violence (e.g., risk factors, protective
factors). This is similar to “structured professional judgment”
or “anamnestic assessment” as they are discussed throughout
this article. 
VALIDATION OF ACTUARIAL, STRUCTURED 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT, AND ANAMNESTIC
APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT 
This section summarizes evidence from the behavioral sci-
ence literature on actuarial and structured professional judg-
ment approaches to risk assessment. Although there are no
specific studies on anamnestic assessment to review, we
describe its foundation and contribution to the process of risk
assessment—and why we believe it can play an important part
in such risk assessments for the courts. For the reader’s conve-
nience, Table 2 provides an overview of the risk-assessment
measures we discuss, along with each measure’s commonly
used acronym.
ACTUARIAL APPROACHES. Meta-analysis is an analytic
technique that allows the investigator to aggregate the results
of multiple studies, creating a more stable estimate of the out-
come.38 The scientific literature in the area of risk assessment
includes numerous meta-analyses that have been performed
since specialized actuarial violence risk-assessment instru-
ments were first developed. One valuable meta-analysis involv-
ing research on mentally disordered offenders and outcomes of
general offending (any crimes) and violent offending (crimes
against persons) found a number of factors that are empirically
associated with these outcomes, including historical variables
(criminal history, juvenile delinquency, hospital admissions,
violence, escape), personality variables (antisocial personal-
ity), and substance abuse.39 But it is noteworthy that the
strongest predictor of violent recidivism was risk level yielded
by objective risk assessment—underscoring the importance of
a risk assessment that is structured and actually includes these
positive predictors and does not include factors such as offense
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TABLE 2: RISK-ASSESSMENT MEASURES CITED IN THIS ARTICLE
ACRONYM FULL NAME
STRUCTURED
PROFESSIONAL 
JUDGMENT OR
ACTUARIAL
HCR-20 Historical, Clinical, Risk 
Management-20
SPJ
LSI-R Level of Service Inventory-
Revised
Actuarial
LCSF Lifestyle Criminality Screening
Form
Actuarial
PCL Psychopathy Checklist Actuarial
PCL-R Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Actuarial
PCL:SV Psychopathy Checklist-
Screening Version
Actuarial
SVR-20 Sexual Violence Risk-20 SPJ
SAVRY Structured Assessment of 
Violence Risk in Youth
SPJ
Static-99 Static-99 Actuarial
VRAG Violence Risk Appraisal Guide Actuarial
YLS/CMI Youth Level of Service/Case
Management Inventory
Actuarial
40.There are obviously reasons other than future offense risk to con-
sider offense severity in legal decision making. But offense seri-
ousness is a very poor proxy for future risk, so consideration of
such seriousness should be for reasons such as retribution, pro-
portional sentencing, and the like.
41.Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy as a Risk Factor for Violence, 70
PSYCH. Q. 181, 181 (1999). Other distinctive features of psy-
chopathy include quickness to anger, irresponsibility, dominance
orientation, grandiosity, an inability to bond with others, an
inability to feel guilt or anxiety, irresponsibility, and arrogance. Id.
42.ROBERT D. HARE & HANS VERTOMMEN, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY
CHECKLIST-REVISED 1 (1991); ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PCL-R: TECH-
NICAL MANUAL 1 (2003). Both the PCL and the PCL-R are 20-item
measures of psychopathic traits scored on a 0-2 scale. Scores of 0
indicate that the individual does not exhibit the trait; scores of 1
indicate that the individual shows some of the trait across life
domains; and scores of 2 indicate that the individual definitely
exhibits the trait across life domains. Scores range from 0-40, with
higher scores indicating the presence of a greater amount of psy-
chopathic traits.
43.DONALD A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE LEVEL OF SERVICE INVEN-
TORY—REVISED 1 (2000). The LSI-R is an actuarial measure of
offender risk, need, and responsivity. It measures these areas con-
sistent with RNR theory, providing guidance for reducing risk
most effectively in addition to classifying risk level. The LSI-R uses
information obtained from interviewing the offender and review-
ing collateral information to rate the offender on 54 items encom-
passing 10 domains: criminal history, education/employment,
financial stability, family/marital status and histories, current
accommodations/housing, leisure/recreation activities, compan-
ions/associates, current and history of alcohol/drug problems,
emotional functioning/adjustment, and criminal attitudes/orienta-
tion. MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 312. Items are rated on a scale
from 0 to 3 where 0 and 1 = 1 and 2 and 3 = 0. Clive Hollin &
Emma J. Palmer, Level of Service Inventory-Revised Profiles of Vio-
lent and Nonviolent Prisoners, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1075,
1079 (2003). Higher scores reflect a higher probability of recidi-
vating. The LSI-R demonstrates satisfactory reliability and predic-
tive validity as evidenced in a considerable amount of research.
Anthony W. Flores et al., Predicting Outcome with the Level of Ser-
vice Inventory-Revised: The Importance of Implementation Integrity,
34 J. CRIM. JUST. 523, 524 (2006).
44.Paul Gendreau et al., Is the PCL-R Really the “Unparalleled” Mea-
sure of Offender Risk? A Lesson in Knowledge Cumulation, 29 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 397, 397-426 (2002).
45.Glenn D. Walters, Predicting Criminal Justice Outcomes with the
Psychopathy Checklist and Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form: A
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89, 89-102 (2003).
46.Glenn D. Walters et al., The Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form:
Preliminary Data, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 406, 406-418 (1991).
The LCSF uses only information from the file to rate an individ-
ual’s irresponsibility, self-indulgence, interpersonal intrusiveness,
and social rule-breaking. 
47.Anne-Marie R. Leistico et al., A Large-Scale Meta-Analysis Relating
the Hare Measures of Psychopathy to Antisocial Conduct, 32 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 28, 28-45 (2008).
48. Id. 
49. Id.
50.Paula Smith et al., Can 14,737 Women Be Wrong? A Meta-Analysis
of the LSI-R and Recidivism for Female Offenders, 8 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 1601, 1601-1626 (2009).
51. Id.
seriousness, which is virtually unrelated to the risk of future
offending or even violent offending.40
The personality construct of psychopathy, characterized by a
cluster of interpersonal, affective, and lifestyle characteristics
such as callousness, manipulativeness, impulsivity, superficial-
ity, and violating the rights of others,41 has been robustly asso-
ciated with violent offending risk for offenders in the commu-
nity. Most research on psychopathy has used the Psychopathy
Checklist (PCL) or the updated Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R) to measure it.42 However, it is noteworthy that the
PCL-R is an “accidental” risk-assessment measure. It was devel-
oped to provide a better way of measuring a personality disor-
der to facilitate research on psychopathy—and turned out to be
a strong measure of re-offense risk in the community. 
Nevertheless, several meta-analyses provide support for the
association between PCL-R score and violence risk in the com-
munity. A 1996 meta-analysis of over 50 studies found the
PCL-R to perform comparably to an established measure of
offense risk and needs (the Level of Service Inventory-Revised,
or LSI-R)43 in predicting violent behavior, with each described
as strongly associated with general and violent recidivism in
the community.44 In a subsequent meta-analysis,45 the predic-
tive capacity of the PCL-R was compared to that of the
Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form46 regarding both general
and violent criminal recidivism for individuals who were
already justice-involved. Both were effective in predicting
criminal recidivism, with neither significantly more accurate
than the other. 
Another meta-analysis addressed the relationship between
antisocial behavior (including crime) and the PCL-R.47 This
meta-analysis included 95 published studies with more than
15,000 participants, creating a broad, stable sample from
which to generalize findings.48 Both PCL-R Factor 1 (aggregat-
ing interpersonal characteristics such as callousness, decep-
tiveness, and superficial charm) and Factor 2 (combining
behavioral and historical attributes such as early conduct prob-
lems, versatility in offense history, and the like) were signifi-
cantly associated with recidivism risk, and Factor 2 was the
stronger predictor.49
Additional meta-analyses show strong results for the ability
of other actuarial instruments to accurately provide risk infor-
mation for both male offenders (for whom it was originally
developed) and female offenders.50 In a 2009 study reviewing
25 published and unpublished sets of data, the researchers
found that the effect sizes (a measure of how much a variable
influences an outcome) for females were comparable to those
for males, indicating that the LSI-R works comparably well with
female offenders.51 It is always possible, of course, that the
development of a risk-assessment measure specific to females
would perform even better. However, it also indicates that the
LSI-R can currently be applied to women without a substantial
loss of accuracy—and suggests that many of the risk factors
that are applicable to men are also important with women. 
These meta-analytic reviews underscore the substantial
body of evidence relevant to the actuarial prediction of violent
behavior. Another important piece in this puzzle is apparent
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52. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 1 (2001);
Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute
Psychiatric Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393-401 (1998).
53.The COVR is a computer-based actuarial assessment that mea-
sures the probability of violence following discharge into the com-
munity among adults who are hospitalized for psychiatric treat-
ment. The COVR guides the evaluator through a brief, structured
chart review and 5- to 10-minute interview with the examinee.
Information obtained through this process is used to rate the
examinee on up to 106 items. The COVR generates a statistical
estimate of the examinee’s violence risk, corresponding confidence
intervals for that estimate, and identifies the risk factors consid-
ered in deriving that estimate. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., CLASSIFICA-
TION OF VIOLENCE RISK: PROFESSIONAL MANUAL 1 (2005); Stephanie
Wilson et al., Structured Instruments Commonly Used in Violence
Risk Assessments, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT 353 (Jay Singh et al., eds. 2016); John Monahan et al.,
The Classification of Violence Risk, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 721, 721-
22 (2006).
54.Daryl G. Kroner et al., A Coffee Can, Factor Analysis, and Prediction
of Antisocial Behavior: The Structure of Criminal Risk, 28 INT’L J. L.
& PSYCHIATRY 360, 360-374 (2005).
55.Kevin S. Douglas & P. Randall Kropp, A Prevention-Based Paradigm
for Violence Risk Assessment: Clinical and Research Applications, 29
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 617, 617-658 (2002).
56.Mark R. McGowan, The Predictive Validity of Violence Risk Assess-
ment within Educational Settings, DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L:
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 876 (2007).
57.Kirk Heilbrun et al., Approaches to Violence Risk Assessment:
Overview, Critical Analysis, and Future Directions, in HANDBOOK OF
VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (2d ed., Randy K. Otto & Kevin Dou-
glas, eds. in press). 
58.Rosalind E. H. Catchpole & Heather M. Gretton, The Predictive
Validity of Risk Assessment with Violent Young Offenders: A 1-Year
Examination of Criminal Outcome, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 688,
688-708 (2003); Kristina Childs et al., A Comparison of Empiri-
cally Based and Structured Professional Judgment Estimation of Risk
using the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth, 12 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 40, 40-57 (2014); Vivienne de Vogel &
Corine de Ruiter, The HCR-20 in Personality Disordered Female
Offenders: A Comparison with a Matched Sample of Males, 21 CLIN.
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 226, 226-240 (2005); Vivienne de
Vogel & Corine de Ruiter, Structured Professional Judgment of Vio-
lence Risk in Forensic Clinical Practice: A Prospective Study into the
from the results of the MacArthur Risk Assessment Study.52
This study remains the largest and best-designed single
research project addressing violence in the community by
those who had been treated in psychiatric hospitals and sub-
sequently discharged to the community. These data, along
with additional data from a subsequent study, were combined
to develop an actuarial tool (the Classification of Violence
Risk, or COVR) that is effective in predicting serious acts of
violence in the community (defined as a threat with a weapon
in hand, or a physical act resulting in significant harm to
another person) committed by individuals with mental disor-
ders.53
Although there has been very noteworthy progress in the
development of specialized actuarial risk assessment measures
since the 1990s, the evidence does not support the superiority
of one particular measure over others. Rather, existing research
seems to indicate that specialized measures that (a) use pre-
dictor variables that are empirically supported and reliably
scored; (b) combine these variables to yield a score that is cal-
culated to provide maximally advantageous information about
the “cut score” to separate different categories of risk, and (c)
are used consistently as intended tend to be comparably good.
To illustrate this in a very specific way, we note that one study
compared the predictive accuracy of three widely recognized
actuarial tools, another approach using “General Statistical
Information on Recidivism,” and four additional instruments
that they developed themselves by randomly selecting items
from the total item pool.54 None of these seven tools was sub-
stantially more accurate than the others. This strongly suggests
that good actuarial measures, while more accurate than
unstructured clinical judgment, apparently owe much of this
enhanced accuracy to their structure (using predictive vari-
ables that show a statistical association with violence or other
offending; requiring that the user follow the rules of the mea-
sure by scoring the items and using the score as indicated). If
this is indeed accurate, then it will not be surprising that
another approach to risk assessment—structured professional
judgment—will also benefit from the application of this kind
of structure. 
STRUCTURED PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT. Struc-
tured professional judgment is a more recently developed
approach to violence risk assessment, with the earliest SPJ
tools appearing in the 1990s. It is similar to actuarial assess-
ment in the use of pre-specified items that can be reliably
scored. But how it uses these items differs. Rather than com-
bining scored items into a final score, the SPJ approach calls
for an evaluator to consider the results of all information col-
lected and then reach a conclusion about whether the eval-
uee’s risk is low, moderate, or high. Items on an SPJ measure
are typically derived from a review of the literature regarding
factors associated with violence rather than adopted from a
specific study or dataset. SPJ also makes the assumption that
the greater the number and severity of the risk factors pre-
sent, the greater the evaluated person’s risk.55 Since evalua-
tors can consider situational influences, special circum-
stances, and other factors not specified on the measure—and
since they can weigh the different items as they like—one
might suspect that SPJ measures are more flexible but some-
what less accurate than actuarial measures in appraising risk.
As we will describe in a moment, however, they are indeed
more flexible but comparable in accuracy when compared
with actuarial measures. 
First, there is clear evidence that SPJ approaches provide an
accurate way of appraising risk. A total of 20 published studies
and one dissertation56 on the relationship between SPJ risk
judgments and violence have been identified.57 Of these 20, a
total of 18 have supported the predictive accuracy of SPJ judg-
ments in relation to violent recidivism.58 Only two studies did
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O’Shea et al., Predictive Validity of the HCR-20 for Violent and Non-
Violent Sexual Behaviour in a Secure Mental Health Service, CRIM.
BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH (2015); Michael J. Vitacco et al., Can
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version of the PCL-R designed for screening, as opposed to diag-
nostic, purposes. ADELLE FORTH ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATHY CHECK-
LIST: YOUTH VERSION 1 (2003).
64. Id.
65.Klaus-Peter Dahle, Strengths and Limitations of Actuarial Prediction
of Criminal Reoffence in a German Prison Sample: A Comparative
Study of the LSI-R, HCR-20, and PCL-R, 29 INT. J. LAW & PSYCH. 341
(2006).
not support SPJ judgments in their prediction of violent recidi-
vism.59
It would also be possible to simply add the item scores on
an SPJ measure to obtain a total score, which could then be
used to make a prediction. Does the judgment made by the
evaluator using an SPJ measure add anything to scores com-
bined in this fashion? Five studies have addressed this ques-
tion. In all five, the final judgment added significantly to the
results that would have been obtained by adding the scores of
the individual items.60
ACTUARIAL VERSUS STRUCTURED PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE RISK ASSESS-
MENT. The scientific evidence described thus far strongly sup-
ports the validity of both actuarial and structured professional
judgment approaches to risk assessment. But how do these
approaches compare to one another? Given that both use pre-
selected items that have a statistical association with violent
recidivism, they are quite similar in both data selection and
data coding. They diverge in their approach to data combina-
tion, however, with actuarial approaches yielding a conclusion
based on an established formula and SPJ approaches calling for
a professional judgment in light of the information obtained.
Given these similarities, it should not come as a surprise if the
two approaches are comparable in their accuracy in appraising
risk. 
Indeed, that is what the limited available evidence shows. In
the five available studies comparing actuarial with SPJ
approaches, three (including one meta-analysis) reflect no sig-
nificant differences between these approaches and the other
two show some advantage to SPJ measures. This is a small
number of studies on which to base a conclusion about a ques-
tion like this, so the conservative interpretation is that these
approaches are comparable.
One study compared the predictive accuracy of one SPJ
measure (the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management 20, or
HCR-20)61 and two actuarial approaches (the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide, or VRAG62, and the PCL-R and PCL:SV).63
All measures performed well, but there was not a particular
advantage to a specific approach or measure.64 A second study
again compared two actuarial measures (the LSI-R and PCL-
R) with an SPJ measure (the HCR-20).65 Only minor differ-
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66.de Vogel et al., supra note 58. The Static-99 is a 10-item actuarial
measure of static risk factors associated sexual recidivism. See
ANDREW HARRIS ET AL., STATIC-99 CODING RULES REVISED-2003 3
(2003). The Sexual Violence Risk-20 is a 20-item SPJ checklist of
risk factors associated with sexual violence. See DOUGLAS PETER
BOER ET AL., MANUAL FOR THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE RISK-20: PROFES-
SIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING RISK OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1
(2003).
67.The YLS/CMI is intended to guide professionals’ clinical judgment
regarding risk assessment and treatment planning of delinquent
youth between the ages of 12 and 17. Professionals using the
YLS/CMI, obtain information from multiple collateral sources,
including interviews with parents, youth, and knowledgeable
third parties, as well as legal, educational, and mental health
records, to rate the youth on eight variables associated with delin-
quency (offense history, family history and situation, education
and employment history and adjustment, peer group, quality of
peer relationships, substance use/abuse, leisure and recreation
activities, psychopathology and personality factors, and antisocial
disposition). The goal of the YLS/CMI is to facilitate case manage-
ment and treatment planning for youth, such that youth with
higher risk of reoffending are offered more intensive interventions.
The YLS/CMI demonstrates adequate internal consistency and
interrater reliability among adolescent male and female offenders
and research supports its criterion and predictive validity. ROBERT
HOGE & D.A. ANDREWS, THE YOUTH LEVEL OF SERVICE/CASE MAN-
AGEMENT INVENTORY MANUAL AND SCORING KEY 1 (2002); MELTON
ET AL., supra note 4, at 312.
68.FORTH ET AL., supra note 63.
69.RANDY BORUM ET AL., MANUAL FOR THE STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT OF
VIOLENCE RISK IN YOUTH-CONSULTATION VERSION 1 (2002).
70.The SAVRY is an SPJ assessment meant for use with adolescents
between ages 12 and 18. The SAVRY consists of 24 risk factors,
classified as Historical (e.g., exposure to violence in the home),
Social/Contextual (e.g., peer delinquency), and Individual/Clini-
cal (e.g. risk taking/impulsivity), and six protective factors from
reoffending (i.e., strong attachments and bonds). The professional
rates the youth on each risk item as high, moderate, or low and
protective factors are marked as either present or absent. The
SAVRY is intended to define, rather than quantify, the primary risk
factors for recidivating in youth. With regards to validity, the
SAVRY demonstrates moderate to strong correlations with the
YLS/CMI and Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version. MELTON
ET AL., supra note 4, at 313;. Catchpole & Gretton, supra note 58.
71.Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic
Comparison of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 740
(2010).
72.HEILBRUN, supra note 2.
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ences in predictive accuracy were observed among these three
measures. 
Another two studies reported a modest advantage in predic-
tive accuracy to SPJ measures. Comparing a brief actuarial mea-
sure (the Static-99) with an SPJ measure (the SVR-20) led to the
conclusion that the latter was significantly better predictively
than the former with 122 sexual offenders admitted to a Dutch
forensic psychiatric hospital between 1974 and 1996.66 Focus-
ing on the use of these measures with adolescents involved a
comparison of two actuarial approaches—the Youth Level of
Service/Case Management Inventory (YLS/CMI)67 and the Psy-
chopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV)68—with the
Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY).69
The SPJ measure (the SAVRY) was significantly more accurate
predictively than either of the actuarial measures.70
Finally, a total of nine risk-assessment tools were evaluated in
a meta-analysis that included both a standard SPJ tool (the HCR-
20) and an established actuarial measure (the VRAG).71 All per-
formed with moderate predictive accuracy, and no significant
superiority was seen for any particular tool or approach. 
The evidence reviewed thus far supports two important
points. First, the predictive accuracy of specialized, structured
risk assessment tools is superior to unstructured clinical judg-
ment in appraising risk. Second, actuarial and structured pro-
fessional judgment approaches are substantially equivalent in
their predictive accuracy—although SPJ approaches are more
flexible, allowing the evaluator to make allowances for differ-
ent situational influences that might not be readily incorpo-
rated into an actuarial measure. For example, an individual
with a history of serious violent behavior as an adolescent,
major family dysfunction, substance abuse, impulsivity, and a
“hot temper” might very well be classified as high risk by
either an actuarial or an SPJ measure. But if that same individ-
ual had recently been in a car accident and sustained a serious
head injury, the actuarial measure (typically composed of
largely static, historical variables) would not change in its con-
clusion that this individual was at high risk for future violence.
The SPJ approach, by contrast, allows the incorporation of this
kind of change far more easily.
ANAMNESTIC APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT. Finally, we turn to the question of whether the
use of yet another approach might enhance the accuracy of
predictions made using either an actuarial or an SPJ approach.
This kind of approach, which uses the person’s own history to
obtain information about risk factors specifically applicable to
that person, is difficult to investigate through research on pre-
dictive accuracy. The identification of risk factors, particularly
treatment targets that are subject to change through interven-
tion, is much better suited to risk management and risk reduc-
tion than it is to prediction. 
Three important points should be made. Assuming a rela-
tionship between the number (and severity) of risk factors pre-
sent and the overall risk level is consistent with broad findings
from SPJ studies. Second, risk assessments performed in the
course of legal proceedings must satisfy the parameters of the
larger legal context. When they do not, there is the risk that
such evidence will not be admitted—or will be accorded little
weight if it is. So the “individualizing” of information collected
as part of psychological or psychiatric evaluations for the
courts is a high priority; unless the court is convinced that the
evidence applies to this individual, at this time, it will not be
seen as useful.72 Third, there can be the kind of drastic changes
in circumstance referenced earlier with the example about the
individual with a head injury. Obtaining detailed information
about a person’s history of violent behavior and the circum-
stances surrounding each event allows a careful look at such
changes and their impact.
Court Review - Volume 53 125
73.David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Sci-
entific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
We cannot assert that anamnestic assessment would be
defensible for use in risk assessment in legal contexts when
used alone, therefore. It does not have the existing scientific
support that has been reviewed in this article for actuarial and
SPJ approaches. But it does enjoy one major advantage over
both of these approaches: risk factors identified using
anamnestic assessment are derived entirely from the individ-
ual’s own history. There is no need to navigate the complex and
thorny problem of “group to individual” inference when apply-
ing evidence.73 In this respect, anamnestic assessment provides
relevant and potentially valuable information while simultane-
ously satisfying any concern about whether that information is
insufficiently individualized, inapplicable to the particular
individual, or “statistical speculation.”
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST PRACTICE IN LEGAL
CONTEXTS
We conclude with several recommendations in light of the
legal context and relevant scientific evidence we have reviewed
regarding risk assessment. First, it is no longer defensible to pro-
vide appraisals of an individual’s risk of future violent behavior
using only unstructured clinical judgment. The empirical sup-
port for such appraisals has been consistently described as so
limited that this practice would not seem appropriate under
either Daubert (which requires some showing of scientific foun-
dation) or Frye (with the development of specialized measures
for risk assessment of a variety of populations, the rendering of
an opinion on risk without guidance from a specialized measure
or some structuring from the literature would no longer appear
to be generally accepted practice within the field). Second, the
use of a specialized measure of risk like those reviewed in this
article is strongly indicated. They provide empirical scientific
support to this kind of expert evidence that is clearly useful and
even compelled under Daubert. Third, it is appropriate when-
ever possible to “individualize” appraisals of risk using an
anamnestic approach that derives risk factors from the individ-
ual’s history. The combination of specialized measures with
highly individualized evidence should address concerns about
evidentiary relevance and “statistical speculation” as part of
expert evidence on risk assessment.
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Across
1 Edible herring
5 Haus wives, aptly
10 Wouk genre
14 To a slight degree, musically
15 Kramden of "The Honeymooners"
16 Home ___ (get close)
17 Speller's clarification phrase
18 Febrero preceder
19 Small but annoying biter
20 Start of a quip by Laurence J.
Peter
23 Foul
24 Famous ___ (cookie brand)
25 More easily understood
29 Ed.'s work
32 Blocks of time
36 Guns N' Roses singer Rose
37 Take care of
39 Part 2 of the quip
43 Burger extra
44 Besides
45 Channel owned by Disney
46 Kesey or Follett
47 Kid's wheels
51 Ultra-bright
52 Honshu seaport
57 End of the quip
62 Panic
63 Stirring
64 Cajun pod
65 Novelist Ambler
66 Hotel quote
LEARNING CURVE by Judge Victor Fleming
58 Ice pellets
59 It's put in banks
60 Signed off on
61 Costner, in "The Untouchables"
62 Attorney's ___
67 Jai ___
68 Wriggly swimmers
69 Twosomes
70 Ash Wednesday follower
Down
1 Reproduce, as salmon
2 Old Testament book
3 Low-pH compounds
4 Proscriptive phrase
5 Guitar-neck bump
6 Assign places to
7 Architect William Van ___
8 Big commotion
9 "Demonstrate!"
10 Sorrowful sounds
11 King of Siam's lady
12 Navy mascot
13 Aardvark victim
21 Big Apple, initially
22 More than bad
26 What a criminal breaks
27 Abbr. after a telephone 
number
28 Samuel on the Supreme Court
29 Word on a door sign
30 Word on an octagon
31 Scattered, like seeds
32 Furry "Star Wars" creature
33 Descartes or Lacoste
34 Very similar
35 ___-cone
38 Barely make, with "out"
40 Advent
41 Outdoor parking facility
42 Anguish
48 Fraidy-cat
49 Words on an arrow
50 Go bad
51 Pushers' nemeses
53 Swede's "Cheers!"
54 Bracelet site
55 Mosque text
56 Look forward to
57 "Wish You ___ Here" 
(1975 Pink Floyd album)
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 125.
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AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION AWARDS 2017
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH AWARD FOR JUDICIAL COURAGE
The award is named in honor of Judge Harold Froehlich of Wisconsin, who as a freshman Republican Congressman
risked his political career by voting in the House Judiciary Committee in favor of the impeachment of President
Richard Nixon. Froelich lost re-election but later served as a trial judge in Wisconsin from 1981 to 2011. The award
honors a judge who makes fair and impartial judgments in accord with the rule of law while exercising independence
from personal consequences.
Winner: United States District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, San Diego, California, who was recognized for his dignity,
courage, and professionalism when, while handling ongoing litigation involving a presidential candidate, he faced
unfair criticism based on his heritage. (The AJA reprints in this issue Judge Curiel’s letter in response to the award, in
which he notes several judges worthy of note for their own displays of judicial courage.)
CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD W. HOLMES AWARD OF MERIT
The award honors a judge for outstanding contributions to the judiciary; it’s named in honor of the late Kansas Chief
Justice Richard W. Holmes, who was one of the founders of the AJA.
Winner: Judge Steve Leben, Kansas Court of Appeals, who was recognized for his national work promoting procedural
fairness in court, for coauthoring AJA white papers on procedural fairness and the mental aspects of judging, and as
the editor of Court Review since 1998.
JUDGE WILLIAM H. BURNETT AWARD
The award honors a judge who is a member of the American Judges Association for outstanding service to the associa-
tion.
Winner: Judge John Conery, Louisiana Court of Appeals, who was recognized for his service as an AJA president, offi-
cer and committee chair; for helping to improve links between the AJA and other organizations; and for his work to
educate other judges in the areas of domestic violence and elder law.
JUDGE BOB JONES MEMORIAL AWARD
The award honors a judge who is a member of the American Judges Association for significant contributions to judi-
cial education.
Winner: Judge Catherine Carlson, Provincial Court of Manitoba, who was recognized for her work on educational
programming for the AJA’s 2016 conference in Toronto, for organizational efforts already underway for the educational
programming for the AJA’s 2018 conference in Hawaii, and for chairing the AJA’s Education Committee.
JUDGE LIBBY HINES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AWARD
The award is named in honor of Michigan Judge Libby Hines, who while an active AJA member and trial judge has
been a national leader and educator for many years on the appropriate judicial handling of domestic-violence cases.
Winner: Judge Ramona Gonzalez, LaCross County (Wisconsin) Circuit Court, who was recognized for her expertise
on family-law topics, including domestic violence and child abduction, and for her national and international leader-
ship on the handling of these matters in court.
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Associa-
tion, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by members of the American Judges Asso-
ciation (AJA), as well as many law libraries.  About 40 percent of the
members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial judges.
Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, including munic-
ipal court and other specialized court judges.  The remainder include
federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges, and adminis-
trative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format.  The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes).  Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook:  A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles.  Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of dou-
ble-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline.  In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated.  Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.  
Submission: Submissions may be made by e-mail to
Editor@CourtReview.org. Submissions will be acknowledged by 
e-mail; notice of acceptance or rejection will be sent following
review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
134 Court Review - Volume 53 
R
THROUGH THE PRESENTATION OF WHITE PAPERS 
ADDRESSING KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO JUDGES
S
Procedural Fairness: 
A Key Ingredient in 
Public Satisfaction
Approved by the AJA 2007
http://goo.gl/afCYT 
S
The Debate over 
the Selection and 
Retention of Judges: 
How Judges Can 
Ride the Wave
Approved by the AJA 2011
http://goo.gl/98IGN 
S
Minding the Court: 
Enhancing the 
Decision-Making
Process
Approved by the AJA 2012
http://goo.gl/RrFw8Y
S
The Judge Is 
the Key Component:  
The Importance of 
Procedural Fairness
in Drug-Treatment
Courts
Approved by the AJA 2015
http://goo.gl/XA75N3
MAKING BETTER JUDGES™
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION 2018 MIDYEAR MEETING
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
The Guest House at Graceland
April 19-21
$145 single/double
THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE:  THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION 2018 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
LIHUE, HAWAII (ISLAND OF KAUAI)
Kauai Marriot Resort
September 22-27
$219 single/double
Co
u
rte
sy
o
fg
u
e
st
ho
u
se
gr
a
ce
la
n
d.
co
m
Co
u
rte
sy
o
fK
a
u
a
iM
a
rr
io
tR
e
so
rt
136 Court Review - Volume 53
o
WEBSITES OF INTEREST
CARA
casetext.com
When a product wins the New Prod-
uct of the Year award from the American
Association of Law Libraries, you take
note. When that product is offered as a
free service for judges, you look more
closely.
That’s where we find ourselves with
CARA, an automated legal-research tool
provided by a company called casetext.
So what got the American Association of
Law Libraries excited about this product?
You can upload any brief or legal
memorandum into CARA—and it will
return a list of cases relevant but not
already cited in the brief or memoran-
dum. Obviously, that could be of great
use to judges. For understandable rea-
sons (not enough money to justify exten-
sive research or briefing, sloppy work,
etc.), the briefs we get from lawyers aren’t
always as thorough as they should be.
CARA offers an easy way to quickly
check for missing caselaw. And at the
price, it’s at least worth a tryout. 
Many attorneys already subscribe to
CARA and use its features by paying a
subscription fee. Casetext tells us that it
has no plans at this point to change its
present practice, which is to make the
CARA product (along with all of its fea-
tures) available to judges at no cost. That
lets you follow links of the cases to the
full text, to see how later cases have sum-
marized the original case, and to filter
your searches by jurisdiction.
For judges who would like to try out
the product, send an email to
courts@casetext.com.
A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
PAMELA CASEY, JENNIFER ELEK & ROGER
WARREN, USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESS-
MENT INFORMATION IN STATE SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS. National Center for State
Courts, Center for Sentencing Initiatives,
2017. 5 pp. 
https://goo.gl/EV9jDe 
The National Center for State Courts’
Center for Sentencing Initiatives has
issued another of its short, highly read-
able reports on key questions involved in
criminal sentencing. Their reports are
backed up by extensive footnotes (here,
endnotes) citing to key research in the
field.
The last report looks at risk-assess-
ment instruments used to predict the
risk of reoffending, as well as risk-and-
needs-assessment instruments that also
look to see what services might be
offered to reduce an offender’s likelihood
of reoffending. These reports are struc-
tured around answers to a series of ques-
tions, in this case ones like how risk-
and-needs-assessment scores are used at
sentencing, how widespread is their use,
is there evidence about the effects of
their use, and are they biased against
racial minorities?
If these questions seem relevant to
your daily work—and you’d like to read
some research-based answers—head over
to the Internet link listed above to take a
look at the report. It complements quite
nicely the article by Professor Heilbrun
and his colleagues found at page 116 of
this issue.
JASON A. CANTONE. ENHANCING COOPERA-
TION THROUGH STATE– FEDERAL JUDICIAL
COUNCILS. Federal Judicial Center, 2017.
45 pp. 
https://goo.gl/LmsFqX 
The Federal Judicial Center issues
pocket guides to assist federal judges.
One of the latest pocket guides, however,
is aimed at both state judges and federal
judges and details how enhanced cooper-
ation between state and federal courts
can increase overall efficiency and assist
both courts. The pocket guide focuses on
the use of state–federal judicial councils,
which allow judges and administrators a
forum to identify sources of potential ten-
sion (e.g., calendar and scheduling con-
flicts, certification of state-law questions,
access to records) and consider how to
share limited resources (e.g., facilities,
emergency preparedness, civics educa-
tion programs, translators). 
The Federal Judicial Center features
the pocket guide on a new public website
(https://goo.gl/T1e165) that also expands
beyond the use of formal councils to
show how state and federal courts can
work informally to address areas of
mutual concern. For courts interested in
forming a state–federal judicial council
(or expanding their current one), the
pocket guide and website offer a list of
topics that could benefit from collabora-
tion, sample activities and handbooks
already completed by active state–federal
judicial councils, and sample forms for
creating a charter or organizing a meet-
ing. For courts not interested in a formal
council, the website also features a 2016
Federal Judicial Center report detailing a
survey on state–federal cooperation that
went out to every federal chief district
judge. The survey results showed a wide
range of activities and topics benefiting
from state–federal cooperation, federal
judges’ interest in further collaboration
with state courts, and an ability to coop-
erate outside of formal councils. The
website also encourages users to submit
other examples of how cooperation
between state and federal courts
improves both judicial systems.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND
BAIL PRACTICES, LAWFUL COLLECTION OF
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: A BENCH
CARD FOR JUDGES. National Center for
State Courts, 2017. 2 pp. 
Key leaders of the state courts, includ-
ing the Conference of Chief Justices, have
formed a task force to address issues con-
cerning the handling in court of fine and
fee collection and the setting of bail. As
part of a new Resource Center (available
at https://goo.gl/Kv7LPK), the task force
has produced a two-page bench card for
judges to use when determining whether
to find someone in contempt for the fail-
ure to pay a fine or fee. We’ve reprinted
the bench card for your use at pages 127-
128 of this issue. Additional resources
can be found at the website.
The Resource Page
g
